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Abstract 
This is the first of a two-part paper in which I would like to propose some possible 
hypotheses on the early origins of symbolic function, which is the most typical feature of 
human being, based on disavowal mechanism. Briefly recalling the main stages of the 
history of symbolism, it will be possible to lay out many of its theories within the 
framework that we wish to outline with this work, this first part of which is mainly 
concerned with the basic psychodynamic notion of disavowal and its possible 
applications, above all in regard to fetishism. 
 
 
Introduction 
One of the main aims of this paper is try to clarify the vexata quæstio on symbolism, its 
nature and origins. Our original motivation for this comes from mathematics and its role 
in the sciences: following Eugene P. Wigner (1960), how does one explain the 
effectiveness2 of this formal and abstract language in natural sciences, like physics? The 
history of mathematics unfortunately comprises many cases of great mathematicians who 
have had alternating severe psychotic states with moments of normality and that, out of 
respect of them we do not quote here.3 Now, mathematics intimately relies on symbolic 
and segnic function, so that it may shed light on these typical human features. Due to this, 
we would like to put forward the hypothesis according to which the symbolic function 
might be the outcome of the dialectic interplay between two concomitant Ego’s 
subagencies always present in every human being which, in turn, would be the outcome 
of an Ego’s splitting mainly according to the Freudian (1938, 1949, 1999) thought based 
on disavowal mechanism4 and supported by the thoughts of other authors, above all H. 
Nunberg, D. Lagache and J. Lacan. Our hypotheses are historiographically supported by 
a considerable research literature which we have taken into account in drawing up this 
paper. The theoretical framework here outlined will turn out to be of some usefulness to 
explain, from a psychodynamics perspective, other already existent ideas on 
mathematical thought from a more properly cognitive viewpoint, like those based on 
embodied mathematics. Indeed, just this last perspective will be much more coherent with 
                                                
1  Correspondence  concerning  this  article  should  be  addressed  to Giuseppe  Iurato, Department  of  Physics  and  Department  of  Mathematics  and  Computer  Science, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy, E‐mail: giuseppe.iurato@unipa.it 2  On account of the reality. 3  See Rosen (1954). 4 This last psychic mechanism has been, wrongly in our view, quite underestimated according  to  Freudian work,  as  Laplanche  and  Pontalis  (1973)  pointed  out,  who, inter  alia,  would want  to  consider  it  a  general  psychic mechanism  of  the  psychic formation and development of every human being. 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what herein is established which, among other things, is based on the notion of bodily 
image, with related phenomena, as formed from the psychodynamics viewpoint. In this 
first part, we retrace the main theories on symbolism from a psychodynamics standpoint 
as well as outline the main psychodynamics elements underlying the notion of Ego’s 
splitting upon which we will build our framework. In the second part, we will apply what 
herein is said to mathematical and physical contexts. From our discussion, it will turn out 
that a primary role is played by the formation of bodily image also as regards the general 
symbolism theory because, for instance, it may explain the possible origin of syntactic 
and semantic structures thanks to the possible relations established amongst its 
component elements together with the possible meanings assigned to them. In short, our 
main idea around which revolves this two-part paper is as follows. Putting the disavowal 
mechanism as a general psychic mechanism, its outcomes are some basic subagencies of 
Ego agency, to be precise the Ideal Ego subagency and the agency system Ego’s Ideal – 
Super-Ego, from whose dialectic interaction takes place most of psychic life, including 
symbolic function as well as degenerative behaviours. In particular, the disavowal is 
closely involved in the bodily image formation which takes place during the well-
determined pregenital phases of human psychosexual development (mainly, from the anal 
phase to the Œdipus one) in the discovery of the primary sexual gender difference from 
which the child, when she/he gives pre-eminence to symbolic elaboration, is able to build 
up her or his personal bodily image, instituting relations (syntax) between its component 
elements together with the assignment of related meanings (semantics). In such a way, 
the child acquires her or his own syntactic and semantic tasks and abilities moulded 
according to her or his strong emotional experience in seeing and discovering the external 
realities given by the sexual apparatuses of both sexes put in reciprocal comparison. In 
doing so, it will therefore be possible to account for the inseparable5 relationships 
between syntax and semantics (at least, in normality) as well as to explain consequent 
and fascinating relationships between mathematics and physics. The paper is therefore 
devoted to debating on this main idea.   
 
First historical outlines on symbolism 
According to Eco (1981) and Petocz (2004), to date, it is not entirely clear what the 
unambiguous origins of the symbolic function of human thought are, although various 
explanatory theories have been proposed to this purpose. In this regard, Eco claims that 
the concept of symbol is epitomizable as a kind of “content’s nebula”, mainly because of 
its polysemic nature. According to semiotic theory, a symbol falls into the wider class of 
signs (according to T. Todorov, 1982a, 1982b). From this perspective, then, U. Eco 
defines a sign as anything that can be taken as “significantly substituting” for something 
else, or rather, a sign is something (whether a natural or an artificial object) which stands 
in place of something that is absent. Historically, the semiotic perspective broadly goes 
from C. S. Peirce to F. de Saussure, K. Bühler and R. Jakobson (see Todorov, 1982a, 
1982b). Peirce gave the first, famous tripartite division of the sign in icon, index and 
symbol, the last being the case in which the relation between signifier and signified is 
arbitrary; thus, the major systematic manifestation of symbols is in language. In contrast, 
F. de Saussure held that it is the sign which is arbitrary, and the symbol which is not 
arbitrary or “motivated” and so does not properly belong to the field of semiotics. 
Therefore, according to de Saussure, the symbol is no longer a kind of sign, the affect 
starting to be a fundamental element in characterizing it, so making the set of symbols 
                                                5  According to Lolli (2000), the syntax is always in searching for the semantics. 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different from the set of signs; both sets are overlapping one with another, the symbol 
being sometimes opposed to the sign, other times classified as a sign. This separation of 
domains, mainly due to the occurrence of the emotional-affective element, gives rise to 
two main entities, namely those of conventional symbols (the signs) and non-
conventional symbols (those not classified as signs). The continuous slipping back and 
forth between them is the main feature of that vexata quæstio of the dualism between sign 
and symbol; in turn, the latter often refers to another crucial question, that of the 
conscious versus the unconscious nature of symbols. There is no doubting the fact that 
conventional symbols are entirely conscious, whereas strong disputes exist regarding the 
nature of non-conventional symbols. It is almost a matter of fact that the latter have a 
double unconscious and conscious nature, so that the critical point relies on the possible 
relationships between them. With Peirce and de Saussure, a prominent role is played by 
the relation between signifier and signified, the primary form of symbol being given by 
metaphor.6 Later, these last perspectives will be compared with the psychoanalytic ones, 
above all with Lacan’s work. In this paper, we simply want to put forward the possible 
hypothesis according to which the fundamental Freudian disavowal mechanism, together 
with the consequent splitting of Ego’s agency, might be considered to underlie the 
possible early origins of this fundamental function which essentially characterizes 
(according to E. Cassirer) all the normal and pathological human thought functions. A 
theory of symbol should be considered first from a psychoanalytic perspective, contrarily 
to a theory of sign which mainly pertains to the cognitive context, all this, in turn, 
referring to the primary distinction between conventional symbols and non-conventional 
ones. Only after having given a psychoanalytic basis will it be possible to consider a 
more cognitive viewpoint built up on the former; these two perspectives are often closely 
intertwined with each other. In this paper, we want to start just from the first 
psychoanalytical paradigm, the Freudian one, which epistemologically lies at the heart of 
every further psychoanthropological trend (according to C.G. Jung, M. Klein, J. Lacan, 
C. Lévi-Strauss, etc.).  
 
Disavowal, fantasy and phantasy  
The primary aim of this work is to put the disavowal process, considered as a 
fundamental universal psychic mechanism (d’après Anna Freud and others), at the basis 
of symbolic function. In pursuing this, as we will see later, the various already existent 
theories on symbolism could, in turn, get a more coherent and systematic classification if 
laid out within this framework based on the disavowal mechanism. According to the last 
Freudian thought, delineated in his last work7 in 1938 and which starts with the analysis 
of fetishism, disavowal might be contemplated as a possible universal psychic 
mechanism which nevertheless, in some cases, might give rise to degenerations in 
paraphilia. We here follow a suggestion by J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis (1973) 
according to which disavowal might be considered a general psychic mechanism 
involved in the formation and development of every human being, although this idea has 
already been considered by other authors, like Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. To be 
precise, disavowal has been considered a fundamental mechanism in the formation and 
structuration of the Ego agency, which is the one that presides in all the secondary 
psychic processes and relationships with reality. Following Rycroft (1968a), in 
                                                6  And this will be the central view of symbolism of C.G. Jung and H. Silberer (1971).  7  See  Freud  (1938,  1949,  1999),  above  all  its  final  Part  III.  This  is  the  main reference, together with Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), herein followed. 
 Language and Psychoanalysis, 2013, 2 (2), 77-120 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2013.008 
 
80 
psychoanalysis the imagination is included in the realm of fantasy, where it forms a 
domain in itself, called phantasy according to English terminology. Therefore, phantasy 
is meant to be an imaginative activity which is at the basis of every human thought and 
sentiment. Each psychoanalytic trend agrees in considering the conscious mental activity 
as supported, accompanied, maintained, animated and influenced by unconscious fantasy 
which starts in childhood, has primarily and originally to do with biological relationships 
and processes, and gives rise to symbolic elaboration (see Rycroft, 1968b). Above all, the 
Kleinian school assumes unconscious fantasy to be an unavoidable means between 
instinct and thought (see Segal, 1981, 1991). Likewise, the orthodox Freudian theory 
locates fantasy into the Id. Furthermore, it is a general statement that (creative) 
imaginative activity entails the participation of a non-verbal unconscious fantasy (see 
Beres, 1950, 1957). According to Isaacs (1952), fantasies are the primary content of 
mental unconscious processes, while unconscious fantasies (understood as the primary 
content of unconscious mental processes) primarily concern the body and represent the 
instinctual aims toward the representation of objects. These fantasies are, in the first 
place, the psychic representatives of libidinal and aggressive instincts. The adaptation to 
reality and the secondary process require the support of concomitant unconscious 
fantasies. All that shall justify what will be said later.  
 
On Ego’s splitting: first outlines 
Through a rapid analysis of the psychoanalytic literature on fetishism (see also Khan 
Masud, 1970, 1979), it will turn out that in the fetish formation process the first forms of 
condensation and displacement mechanisms take place, which are the two main 
psychodynamic processes underlying any symbolic formation. In the following, fetish 
formation will be compared too with that of the transitional object. Their paths meet 
frequently, until they become different to each other with psychic maturation, 
distinguishing between two possible choices, namely normality and pathology 
(perversions8). However, these two entities, fetish and transitional object, have many 
common points amongst them in the first stages of human psychosexual development. At 
the same time, according to the last 1938 Freudian thought, an Ego’s splitting with the 
formation of two subagencies takes place, which will be called Ego’s Ideal and Ideal Ego 
(see Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1975). Nevertheless, both these 
names are due to Hermann Nunberg (1932) and Daniel Lagache (1961) and not to 
Sigmund Freud who explicitly introduced and used only the name Ego’s Ideal in his 1914 
work On Narcissism to denote an autonomous intrapsychic formation to which the Ego 
refers itself to evaluate its effective realizations or representations (see Galimberti, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Freud himself, in the On Narcissism (of 1914) as well as Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (of 1922) and The Ego and the Id (of 1923) 
speaks too of an Ideal Ego (Idealich) but identifies it with the Ego’s Ideal (Ichideal) and 
this, in turn, with the Super-Ego, even if in some points of his discussion a certain 
distinction between them seemed already to be possible. The Ego’s Ideal has narcissistic 
origins going back to the primary identification and which precede all further object 
relations. Such a narcissistic state is lost thanks to parents criticisms toward the child. The 
interiorization of such criticisms gives rise to agencies of self-observation. Subsequently, 
other authors, such as H. Nunberg (1932, 1955, 1975), J. Lacan (1961) and D. Lagache 
(1958), retook two such Ego’s agencies as distinct from each other. On the other hand, as 
                                                8 In this regard, it is useful to remember the incisive Freudian expression according to which “perversions are, in a certain sense, the ‘negative’ of neuroses”. 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already said above, in the last period of his work, Freud himself implicitly started to 
distinguish between these two Ego’s subagencies. Their interplay might be the 
interpretation key to all the following psychic behaviour. We will return later on to these 
last arguments. 
 
Some epistemological considerations 
The general epistemological problematic concerning the psychoanalytic disciplines and 
their foundations is well known to be complex and intricate, and is included in the wider 
problematic concerning the long-standing difficult relationships between 
Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften (d’après W. Dilthey). According to 
Caramelli9 (1984, 1985) and Carotenuto (1982), every psychological theory is the result 
of the subjective and individual experience of its author, so that each of these will 
represent aspects of psychic reality that might elude others (gnoseological relativism). 
Therefore, only the whole composite framework made by all the possible theories of 
psyche will provide, at a given historical moment, a certain knowledge framework of 
human psyche. Thus, psychoanalysis also has a deep historicist10 and pluralistic 
dimension as a doctrine’s field (which we might call a historicist gnoseological 
relativism), and, hence, we may use different theoretical frameworks to coherently 
explain a given psychic phenomenon without meeting contradictions. In this sense, we 
could use in a concomitant manner elements of different authors’ theories, provided that 
the minimal requisites of non-contradiction and coherence are respected. On the other 
hand, in some respects, this last relativistic and opportunistic epistemological stance is 
much nearer to the last epistemological anarchism ideas of P. Feyerabend (see 
Abbagnano, 1998) that the author himself would want to consider as related to a general 
gnoseological method. In this paper, for instance, we will mainly follow the last Freudian 
thought as exposed in Freud (1938, 1949, 1999), but, at the same time, we will refer to 
many other thoughts systems which may have relationships (of coherence, analogy, 
confirmation, support, integration or completion) with the main ideas herein exposed and 
mainly based on the Freudian disavowal mechanism. However, a beautiful and 
emblematic example of the validity and application of this epistemological stance is 
provided by the same Jacques Lacan’s theory which is an almost unique systematic and 
organic framework making harmonic and coherent use of different theories like 
anthropology, linguistic, literature, arts, etc., as well as the thought system of many other 
authors. 
 
On symbolism: first considerations  
On etymological meaning  
According to Abbagnano (1998) and Galimberti (2006), the word symbol derives from 
the Greek noun σύμβολου (with Latin transliteration sӯmbolum), this from 
σύμβᾰλλω, in turn derived from the verb συμβάλλειν (with Latin 
transliteration sým bállein) which, in composition, means “throw together”. It is 
                                                9 We have, above all,  taken  into account the works of  this author because they are closest to the methodological aims that we would like to follow here. 10 Which, in turn, is nearer to the common area given by the non‐void intersection between the evolutionistic epistemology ideas and the genetic epistemology ones. 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characterized, like the sign, by an a priori postponement which, on the one hand, includes 
the symbol in the sign’s order as a specific case of it (as a conventional symbol), whereas, 
on the other hand, it is opposed to the sign itself because the latter has a predetermined 
relationship with what it denotes or connotes (aliquid stat pro aliquo11), whereas the 
symbol, instead, in evoking its corresponding part, refers to a given reality which is not 
decided by some form of convection but by the recomposition or assembling of a whole 
(in respect of its original etymological meaning, as a non-conventional symbol). Roughly 
speaking, there is no rigid link between a symbol and what it symbolizes. Nevertheless, 
the relationships between sign and symbol are never well delineated in a clear manner. 
The psychoanalytic perspective might yet provide useful clarifications, above all that of 
the Kleinian trend and that of the British middle group headed by Donald W. Winnicott, 
if one takes into account the early etymological meaning of the term “symbol” (see also 
Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973), i.e., the one that refers to the “assembling of a set of 
things”. Following Petocz (2004), which quotes a Lévi-Strauss consideration, the concept 
of meaning is so difficult to define perhaps because of its intimate reciprocal connection 
with the notion of symbol. On the other hand, the noun σύμβολου, i.e., a “tally”, 
originally referred to each of the two corresponding pieces of some small object which 
contracting parties broke between them and kept as proof of identity when rejoined 
together.12 That meaning subsequently expanded to include a diversity of meaning such 
as other kinds of tokens, seal, contract, sign, code, etc. In this regard, see also Laplanche 
and Pontalis (1973). 
  
On interpretation and symbolism: a first sight 
For our purposes, it is fundamental to sketchily consider the essence of the conception of 
symbol from the semiotic stance. Indeed, according to Eco, the symbol is considered as a 
“decision”, since the symbolic world always and everywhere presupposes an invention’s 
process applied to a recognition, i.e., one finds an element which might assume, or has 
already assumed, segnic function, and decides, then, to see it as the projection of a 
portion having a sufficiently imprecise content. On the other hand, following Laplanche 
and Pontalis (1973), when one speaks of mathematical or linguistic symbols, any 
reference to a natural relationship or to an analogical correspondence is excluded, that is 
to say, the typical segnic denotation or connotation relation (for instance, in the 
Ferdinand de Saussure meaning) does not hold for them: to show a very elementary 
algebraic example, the following relation among integers, , may 
have completely different symbolic13 meanings depending on whether it refers to the set 
of integers  or to the set of congruence classes modulo , namely  ( ). Therefore, 
its meaning depends on the given contextual interpretation, as we will see later. 
Following Rycroft (1968a, 1968b), in psychoanalytic theory a sign points out the 
presence of something more or less directly identifiable, whereas a symbol refers to 
                                                11  In other words, “something stands for something else”.  12  So  that  its  meaning  refers  to  something,  like  an  object,  and,  through  its fragmentation,  to  the  idea  of  a  link  or  bond.  This  will  be  coherent  with what  is pursued in this paper about bodily image formation in fetishism, Ego’s splitting and their relations with symbolism. 13 Which must be considered as distinct from the segnic meaning of its components, such as  and  , which refer to the conventional symbol class. We will return later to such questions in the second part of this two‐part paper. 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something different from what it is. The importance of a symbol derives just from that 
something else in which it puts off, which is reachable only through a suitable 
interpretation. Signs directly reveal their meaning, whereas symbols require a kind of 
decoding through a correct interpretation. This is the main difference between sign and 
symbol, which is emphasized only within the classical psychoanalytic theory while in 
other contexts (cf. Peirce’s theory of sign) such a distinction is more elusive. From our 
point of view, if one wants, for example, to try to explain why mathematics is a suitable 
interpretative language for natural sciences, it is not possible to prescind from the 
psychoanalytic perspective on symbolism. Indeed, whilst the connection between the sign 
and the thing to which it refers has a conscious nature, the symbol establishes an 
unconscious replacement, through displacement and condensation, of an image, an idea 
or an activity with another. This last viewpoint will be clearer later when we discuss C. 
Rycroft’s work. Moreover, for further discussion on mathematical symbolism, see the 
second part of this paper. 
  
Some linguistic aspects 
However, we are not interested here in all the theories on symbolism14 but only in those 
which, in a certain sense, might be explained through (or correlated to) the line of thought 
that we wish to delineate in this paper, i.e., the one centred on the Freudian disavowal 
mechanism. Namely, we will consider those theories according to which the symbol is 
considered to be different from the sign, both in the lack of a conventional and rigid order 
which sets up the possible signifier-signified relationships (according to de Saussure) and 
in the fact that the symbol is conscious whereas the symbolized is unconscious. 
Nevertheless, in what will follow, the comparisons between segnic and symbolic 
functions will be frequent, since their domains are inseparable although distinct from one 
another, as already said in the previous sections. From our point of view, we consider the 
symbolic function as preceding the segnic one, and having deep unconscious roots; the 
latter, then, will start from the former.15 Our intention, therefore, is to focus on the first, 
ancestral nucleus of such a symbolic function, whose early origins we would want to 
bring back to certain crucial aspects of the last 1930s Freudian thought (see Freud, 1938, 
1949, 1999) on human psychic evolution. Following Rycroft (1968a, 1968b), E. Jones 
was one of the first scholars of symbolism from the orthodox viewpoint. According to 
him, symbolism is always the result of an intrapsychic conflict between the repressing 
tendencies and the repressed material. Only those repressed objects that cannot be 
sublimated need to be symbolized, so there is a close relationship between the 
sublimation processes and the symbolization. Nevertheless, Freud himself wasn’t so 
radical in considering symbolism as exclusively confined to the primary process as Jones 
was. Indeed, in his last work in 1938, Freud reached the conclusion that the linguistic 
symbols used in dreams have mainly an unconscious meaning and originate during the 
earliest language development stages. So, Freud presumed that the symbolic function was 
in some respects correlated with the formation of the verbal linguistic one.  
  
                                                14 However,  brief  outlines  on  some  of  them  will  be  delineated  in  the  following sections. 15 This is coherent with what is said above about the mainly unconscious nature of symbol and conscious nature of sign.  In  this regard,  then,  it will not be possible  to prescind  from  the notable Lacan œuvre which,  inter alia,  is based on  the previous work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson. 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On psychoanalytic symbolism  
According to Segal (1991), it is not possible even minimally to approach the subject of 
fantasy (hence, of creativity) and of dreaming without considering the unconscious 
symbolism; this is because both are closely intertwined and interconnected between them. 
Freud distinguished between a conscious symbolism (such as a metaphor) and an 
unconscious one. Again following Rycroft (1968a, 1968b)16 and Segal (1991), within the 
Ernest Jones framework on symbolism there is a close connection between the 
sublimation process and symbolic formation, which is the pivotal key to understanding 
any creative process, the latter being present where the former is missing. According to 
Jones, there are some main features of symbolism, namely: (i) the symbolic process is 
completely unconscious; (ii) each symbol represents ideas of Self and of the own family, 
as well as birth, love and death phenomena; (iii) each symbol has a constant meaning and 
is the result of an intrapsychic conflict between the repressing tendencies and the 
repressed material; (iv) only the repressed material needs to be symbolized; and, finally, 
(v) the emotional charge which invests the symbolized object has not been able enough to 
perform that qualitative modification given by sublimation. Therefore, according to 
Jones, symbols have nothing to do with sublimation. However, many points of Jones’s 
theory of symbolism have been reworked out, amongst others by Melanie Klein, 
loosening their strong constraining character. As already said in the previous sections, 
even Freud wasn’t as rigid about symbolism as Jones was, for instance allowing many 
possible meanings for the same symbol. Freud himself, then, was aware that at the basis 
of dream and artistic activity was unconscious fantasy, hence symbolic thought. 
Sublimation is a psychic process provided by Freud for trying to explain the higher 
human thought functions, thereafter counted as a general defence mechanism by his 
daughter Anna Freud (1937),17 and yet quite neglected by psychoanalysis which has not 
still given a coherent theory of it (see Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Given the close 
relationships of sublimation with secondary processes, perhaps it would be possible to 
bring back the segnic function to the sublimation process rather than the symbolic one 
whose process is quite different from the former, albeit both are intertwined with one 
another. For instance, according to Rycroft (1968a, 1968b), symbolization and 
sublimation are two psychic processes which have displacement as a common energetic 
exchange mechanism. Rycroft (1968a) states that sublimation is considered to be strictly 
related to scopophilia (roughly speaking, the pleasure of watching, one of the basic 
childish drives, from which derives the so-called epistemophilia (see Rycroft, 1968a), or 
else, general human intellectual activity is a sublimation of this, which follows from 
childhood inhibitions of sexual curiosities. Moreover, according to the author, all 
sublimations depend on symbolization, while all the Ego’s development depends on 
sublimation. In turn, the splitting process (upon which is also based disavowal) has 
mainly to do with the Ego’s development. In short, from what has been said so far, it is 
evident that there are links between the symbolism and sublimation processes and human 
psychosexual development. In this paper, on the basis of what has just been said, we 
would like to point out some possible relationships between the symbolic function and 
the disavowal mechanism, the latter supposed to be, d’après Laplanche and Pontalis 
(1973), a general psychic formation process (closely related to Ego’s structuration) not 
only relegated to pathology, as already Freud himself had hypothesized in his last notable 
                                                16  See also Bott Splillius et al. (2011). 17    She  considered  sublimation,  splitting  and  disavowal  as  comprising  the  set  of defence mechanisms of the Ego (see Rycroft, 1968a). According to her, sublimation is concerned with normality. 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1938 work, and subsequently accepted by his daughter (and other post-Freudians) as a 
normal defence psychic mechanism.   
 
On the viewpoints of Charles Rycroft and Hanna Segal 
Charles Rycroft (1968b) gave a useful and original interpretation of symbolism. This is 
neither a hereditary18 nor exclusive prerogative of the unconscious realm. The symbols 
are the outcomes of a cathexis displacement from the images of the objects of primary 
interest (like those involved in the primary identification) to the images of objects 
perceived in the external world. Once formed, a symbol may be used either by primary or 
secondary processes. When a symbol is used by a primary process, its meaning becomes 
independent from the object that it originally represented; hence, it will be involved in 
fantastic processes, like neuroses and dreams. When, instead, a symbol is used by a 
secondary process, it will continue to represent a suitable object of the external world and 
will become part of conscious and unconscious imaginative processes that promote the 
development of a certain sense of reality. Rycroft follows Melanie Klein and Isaacs 
(1952) in assuming that the sense of reality is supported and favoured by fantasy. Rycroft 
distinguishes between fantasy that intensifies reality and fantasy that maintains illusory 
(or neurotic) substitutes for reality. To the first, he gives the specific name of 
imagination, which is a fundamental component to evaluate reality. According to Rycroft 
(who, in turn, starts from the previous work on symbolism of L. S. Kubie and M. Milner 
– see Rycroft, 1968b), the words are classified as symbols closely related to 
consciousness that favour the secondary processes. The words are also closely related to 
object relations because verbalization is a form of communication between objects. On 
the other hand, within the Kleinian framework, Hanna Segal (1991) also made further 
and original contributions to symbolism (see also Bott et al., 2011). On the basis of her 
clinical material drawn from the analytic treatment of psychotic patients, she identified 
two main symbolic functions. The first function is called symbolic equation and relies on 
the basis of concrete schizophrenic thought: in it, the symbol is equated with the 
symbolized object, up to the point where it is lived as identical to the latter. In this regard, 
Segal refers to a clinical case in which a psychotic patient, at a certain moment in his life, 
broke off to play the violin; when he was asked why, he curtly replied: “Do you want 
maybe that I publicly masturbate?” Now, playing a violin has the psychoanalytic 
meaning of masturbation, so that, for him, a violin is a penis, so that playing a violin is 
masturbating and therefore it cannot be done in public. The intuition of the second 
function, however, came from a clinical case regarding a neurotic. It has been called 
symbolic representation and has to do with the true symbolism of normal thought. 
Through it, the symbol represents the object but must not be entirely equated to it. If one 
dreams of playing a violin, then the violin, yes, represents the penis, but distinguished 
from it, so that one may personify unconscious fantasies of masturbation and, at the same 
time, remain quite distinguished to use the violin to play in such a manner to separately 
represent a sexual act. The passage from the first function to the second one is well 
illustrated by a clinical case treated by Claudine Geissman (see Segal, 1991) and 
references therein) in regard to a psychotic eight-years-old girl who initially wasn’t able 
even to speak but rather was only interested in everything that had a spherical form, as 
well as showing aggressiveness and violence toward everybody and everything which 
resembled a human being (like dolls, etc.). By means of the transfer of the child to an 
analyst, Geissman stated that such objects were the concrete counterparts of maternal 
                                                18   Unless one accepts the hypothesis of a collective unconscious, like Jung. 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body or analyst, so that all this framework built up by the girl was turned toward a 
maternal figure and her body. Gradually, through the analysis, the child started to speak 
in an ever more complex manner and to make drawings which had balls as subjects, the 
first indications of a slow formation of a symbolic representation of parts of the maternal 
body. Moreover, the child gradually started to join partial objects or fragments into a 
whole one, until she was able to put herself into a relationship with other children as well 
as to read, speak and write. So, after having considered other case studies, Segal was 
persuaded that the first symbolic function would correspond to the paranoid-schizoid 
position (concrete symbolism) while the second one would correspond to the depressive 
position (depressive symbolism). Segal states that, in the symbolic equation, the symbol 
substitute is felt to be the original object. The properties of the substitute are not 
recognized or admitted. The symbolic equation is used to deny the absence of an ideal 
object or to control a persecutory one (like a phallus), and belongs to the first stages of 
the Ego’s development.19 The real symbol, available for the sublimation and favourable 
for the development of the Ego, is, instead, felt to be representing the object whose 
characteristics are recognized, respected and used. It develops when the depressive 
sentiments predominate over the paranoid-schizoid ones and when the separation from 
the object, the ambivalence, the guilt and the loss may be experienced and tolerated.20 
Once this is done, it will also be possible to come back to symbolic equations. The 
general symbolic formation will determine the ability to communicate because every 
internal and external communication is made by symbols, so that when schizoid disorders 
take place in the object relations, the communication capacity will also be damaged. For 
instance, in psychotic patients, symbols, being uniquely conceived in a concrete manner, 
do not have any emotional charge so they cannot be felt by others, making effective 
interpersonal communication impossible. In regard to the two symbolic functions above, 
Segal states too that there exists no symbolic function without the remaining one, that is 
to say, there will be a prevalence of one of these but without fully eliminating the other 
one. These two symbolic functions operate next to one another, with reciprocal influence 
and possible regressions to primitive stages. And this last fact might also be related to the 
indivisible binomial made by the symmetric and asymmetric thought of Matte Blanco’s 
theory (see Iurato, 2013). One of the greatest achievements of a depressive position is 
having given to the human individual the ability to integrate and to encompass most of 
the primitive aspects of her or his experience, comprising primitive symbolic equations. 
This last point is of fundamental importance for a creativity theory according to the 
Kleinian standpoint (and others). Once the right passage has been made from concrete 
symbolism to a depressive one, then it will be possible to perform a further step towards 
abstraction, for instance with verbalization. However, from this, we cannot deduce that 
pure abstraction thought is necessarily an indication of mental health. Indeed, this 
capacity might also be the outcome of a splitting (of the Ego) in which abstract thought is 
fully devoid of emotive meaning or charge, as in psychotic states (see also Matte 
Blanco’s thoughts in this regard). For instance, in schizophrenic patients, very often there 
is simultaneity between a coarsely concrete symbolization and complete abstractions 
devoid of emotive (and, in some cases, of intellectual) meaning.  
 
                                                19 And this point is of fundamental importance from our point of view based on the disavowal  mechanism  which  is  considered  by  Melanie  Klein  to  be  like  a  normal psychic mechanism. 20  Within this position will take place the basic psychic function of the separation of opposites. This point has also been stressed by R. Money Kyrle (see Segal, 1991). 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On the development of Freudian libido: a brief sketch 
Herein, for completeness and for giving a semblance of organic unity to the whole 
treatment, we briefly outline the main points of Freudian psychosexual development, 
with slight additions and contributions due to other authors which must be understood 
according to the above-mentioned epistemological considerations. 
 
On object relationships  
The strong instinctual reduction due to homination (that is to say, the passage from 
primates to the genus Homo), gave rise to the human existential problem of managing the 
consequent instinctual energy content which has supervened as a result of such a drive 
deconstrainment. The human being is characterized, as well as by needs, by desire which 
is roughly meant as a sort of incoercible psychic tension which has to be necessarily, 
internally or externally invested. So, for the human being, it is indispensable to find 
objects21 upon which to direct, or to invest, such an energy content. The consequent 
relations established with these objects (animated or not) are generically called object 
relationships. These were explicitly introduced by post-Freudians, first of all by the 
Melanie Klein school, even if the notion of object relation was already present, in nuce, 
in the Freudian notion of cathexis of a drive (or instinct) which characterizes the 
inescapable human disposition to make interrelationships with something else (which 
belongs to the external or own internal world), said to be the cathexis object, which, in 
turn, will be represented by the individual in various manners. The Freudian cathexis has 
a source, an object and a drive destination (or instinctual aim) as fundamental 
constitutive elements. The first one is the (bodily) zone, or the somatic apparatus, in 
which the related libido excitation takes place and originates. The second one is the 
means by which or with which the drive may reach its (instinctual) aim. It is the 
necessary correlative of the drive destination, and is mainly determined by the personal 
history (above all, infantile) of the individual but constitutionally is quite undetermined 
since it may be either a person or a partial real or fantasmatic object. Finally, the third 
one is that particular and necessary activity, or that specific action, due to the push of the 
drive itself to obtain the given satisfaction, and that often is oriented and sustained by the 
fantasmatic or imaginative elaboration of the individual herself or himself. Hence, we 
sketchily have 
 
. 
 
These last notions are the generalization of the correlative ones of sexuality: for instance, 
the object corresponds to the sexual object, that is to say, the person who exerts the 
sexual attraction, while the aim corresponds to the sexual satisfaction, that is to say, it is 
the action due to, or raised by, drive pushes. The first (bodily) Ego formations mainly 
involve a correct balancing of the primary narcissism, a regulation of primary 
identifications (through introjection-projection mechanisms), and a beginning of a sense 
of reality and of a corporal image of Self.  
 
                                                21 We could consider the notion of object or thing  in the wider philosophical sense. In psychoanalysis, then, a restricted sense is assumed mainly correlated to the post‐Freudian  notion  of  object  relation  (see  Laplanche  &  Pontalis,  1973;  Galimberti, 2006). 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The psychosexual development  
In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (of 1905), besides outlining the above notion 
of object cathexis, Freud worked out the main lines of his celebrated theory on the stadial 
or phasic development of human sexuality which is meant to be mainly driven by the 
agency of Id (or Es), which is understood as the place of all the instincts ruled by the 
principle of pleasure. According to him, human sexuality22 starts at birth (if not before, in 
the prenatal phase) with two main stages, the pre-Œdipus stage, from birth to about four 
years old, and the Œdipus stage, from about five years old to about seven years old, to 
carry on with the latency phase, from about eight years old to about twelve years old, 
hence with puberty (or the genital phase), from about thirteen years old to about fifteen 
years old, ending with adolescence, from about sixteen years old to about eighteen years 
old. In turn, the pre-Œdipus stage includes: a first oral phase, from birth to about one 
year old, in which the somatic Ego23 begins to form with the recognition of the first 
partial objects together the establishment of the incorporation’s instinct; an anal phase, 
from about the first year to about two years old, in which a self-erotic narcissistic attitude 
prevails – it begins to express the first ambivalence phenomena and to structure the basic 
tasks of restraining and expelling faeces; a phallic phase, from about two years old to 
                                                22  In what  follows, we refer  to  the basic work of Piscicelli  (1994).  In  it,  there  is an exposition  of  Freudian  human  psychosexual  development  integrated  with  post‐Freudian thought, above all the Kleinian one and that of its followers. For instance (see Piscicelli, 1994), it should be necessary to distinguish between a first monadal phase  (mainly  prenatal)  and  subsequent  symbiotic  phase  (which  includes  the oral and anal ones; this term is due to M. S. Mahler) where the essential psychosomatic mother‐child  relationship  prevails  and  through  which  begin  to  form  and  be structured  the  first  cores of  the Self,  above all by means of  a basic dyadic  relation (moulding onto  the  previous mother‐child  relationship).  In  these  phases,  the  first differentiations  between  the  Self  and  the Other  will  begin  to  take  place,  the  first ambivalence  and  opposition  tendencies  will  appear  through  the  formation  of opposite pairs (that is to say, the first germs of philosophical pairs),  like love‐hate, cohesion‐splitting,  desire‐refusal,  approaching‐estrangement,  and  so  on.  In  short, the  dialectic  thought  which  plays  a  primary  role  for  the  consciousness  begins  to form.  The  transduction  of  the  psychosomatic  organization  and  contents  into  the elements  and  functions  of  thought  requires  a  long  procedure  made  by  variously combined experiences mainly driven by a good mother. This is due to the fact that human thought mainly has its origin in the transferring of satisfaction of needs from an  initially  autarchic  system  toward  relational  exchange  procedures  (including object relations, anaclitic and diaclitic phases of object dependence, etc). These last will  reach  their  highest  performance  and  definition with  the  advent  of  paranoid‐schizoid and depressive Kleinian positions, which are indispensable for recognizing objects as thinkable entities.  In the actuation and in the subsequent overcoming of these  positions,  the  above‐mentioned  symbiotic mother‐child  relationship will  be essential, which is mainly psychosomatic in its incipient phase and whose dynamics will  be  explicated  through  object  relations.  From  what  has  just  been  said,  the importance played by Kleinian thought with its subsequent evolutions is clear.  23 Following Vegetti Finzi (1976), the maternal figure, with those deeply ambivalent feelings which she arouses, is the first core around which gradually the child’s Ego starts to be organized along with, at the same time, her or his ability to recognize the other. 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about three years old, in which, at first, sexual gender differences, in their structural and 
arrangement order, are noticed (although, since the oral phase, both baby boys and baby 
girls have already discovered their own genitals), to be then able to recognize the Other 
together with the coming of some attitudes toward sublimation phenomena; and, finally, a 
urethral phase, from about three years old to about four years old, in which a bladder 
sexuality prevails, and which is often parallel to the phallic phase. Self-eroticism, which 
initially characterizes the incipiency of the pre-Œdipus stage, gradually evolves, within 
the familiar triangulation, toward hetero-directed sexual forms which will lead to the next 
Œdipus stage. In it, castration anxieties, penis envy phenomena and first formations of 
Super-Ego agency will prevail; it will finish with the crucial apical advent of the so-
called Œdipus complex. In the next latency phase, after the relevant Œdipus complex, a 
general sexual quiescence phase takes over in which the major part of libidinal activities 
and fantasies are repressed or sublimated24 but not fully eliminated. Thereafter, the fast 
increase of pubertal neurophysioendocrine activity leads to a libido re-emersion with a 
new and fast phase of sexual development, corresponding to puberty. During this, a kind 
of recapitulation of the previous phallic and anal phases takes place, along with a revival 
of sexual interest with related conflictual recrudescence at first toward the parents (as in 
the previous Œdipus complex), then oriented (unless there were previous pathological 
fixations) toward other cathexis objects (in general, extra-familiar) with the coming of 
adolescence. So, in a certain sense, a definitive disposition will be reached, at first sexual 
then characterial, of the human personality, through the overcoming of late adolescence. 
These are, very briefly, the main points of the Freudian framework of human 
psychosexual development, in which we will lay out most of the considerations of this 
paper. We want to highlight this as the first five to six years of life are very decisive in 
the formation of human personality, as is now almost unanimously recognized (see 
Mastrangelo, 1975). 
 
On phallic phase 
For our aims, it is important to further highlight other aspects of the phallic phase. As 
already said above, in the phallic phase the organization of genital pleasure prevails and 
there are predominant interests in the sensitivity of those organs whose functionality is 
particularly present from about three years old to about five years old. From this period 
hereafter, no matter what their possible origins, this excitation is focused and invested on 
the genitals, the sexuality being lived only in a self-erotic manner. In this phase, the 
drives revolve around the crucial question of having or not having the phallus (in its 
highest symbolic meaning) which is the main reference point and drive orientation line 
for both sexes. It is the central executive organ of the whole libido: for instance, it will be 
the high unit of the genital function which melts in itself all the partial drives coming 
from the various erogenous zones25. This last phenomenon has been called erotic anfimix 
by S. Ferenczi (see Nunberg, 1932, 1955, 1975). But, in this period, ithe first notions of 
                                                24 During this period of sexual development, there is little clarity about the possible relationships  between  repression  and  sublimation  mechanisms.  Moreover,  as already  said,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  general  sublimation mechanism, from the work of Freud until now (see Gay, 1992).  25 This will play a fundamental role in the formation of bodily image as we will see later when discussing fetishism. 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space and time also begin to form,26 which also assist the formation of the corporal 
scheme, notwithstanding their categories are still not well defined from the logical 
viewpoint. Furthermore, in this phase, not all children are able to identify gender genital 
differences, although this phase is mainly focused on seeing and hearing in order to 
identify the possible cathexis objects of desire, remembering these through their symbolic 
meanings. In this phase, children develop the narcissistic conviction that there exists a 
unique genital organ,27 the phallus, which they attribute, erga omnes, to every human 
being, no matter their sex, and even to inanimate objects (see Nunberg, 1932, 1955, 
1975). Children are unable to imagine human beings as devoid of a phallus, which is 
understood as a mere narcissistic pleasure organ. Such a prevalence of the image of the 
phallus as a symbolic representation of the potential of pleasure is also interpretable as a 
chiasma effect28 between psychosomatic-emotive experiences and psychomental ones 
ruled by logical thought. Therefore, the psychosomatic aspects, which manage the 
emotions, act too as a support for the subsequent logical thought functions and for the 
exchange of affects.29 As already said, in this phase children are persuaded that only one 
genital organ exists, the phallus, noting too that there exist only the castrated and the not 
castrated, so coming on to configure the castration fantasy which has an archetypical 
                                                26 According to K. Lorentz (see Oliverio, 1982), the abstraction’s capacity for human thought has a phylogenetic origin during that particular homination period in which the  advent  of  prehensility  and  the  development  of  visual  capacities – which  have taken place thanks to  the conquered bipedalism (or standing position) – allow the first manual exploratory activities (like the analysis of internal cavities, and so on). Nevertheless,  to  the  formation  and  structuration  of  bodily  Ego,  a  primary  role  is played  by  sensorial  developments  linked  to  the  cephalic‐caudal maturation which precedes  the  neural‐muscular  one.  So,  olfaction,  vision  and  hearing  are  the  first corporal physiological determinants contributing to the formation of bodily Ego (see also Greenacre, 1971).   27    This  explains why  this  phase  is  often mentioned  as well  as  the unique  genital 
phase.  28 With this term, one refers to those particular situations in which certain different, and often opposed, aspects or dimensions of a given phenomenon undergo a kind of intimate union into an indissoluble interlacement where they will configure almost in  a  reciprocal  interrelation  of  mutual  exchange  and  biunivocal  influence,  until reaching symbiotic forms of mirror equivalence. This meaning is due to an extension of that related to the chiasmus of rhetoric figures. On the other hand, Freud himself claimed,  in  his  1927  paper  on  fetishism,  that  traumatic  amnesia  (which  leads  to screen  memories,  in  turn  closely  related  to  these  chiasma  effects)  could  be considered to be a paradigm of fetish formation. To be precise, the fetish, as a screen memory,  would  be  the  outcome  of  the  awareness  of  a  traumatic  real  experience whose related cathexis’ energetic charge gives the distance between such a screen and the real event. Its amount provides an estimate for the severity of the impact of the conflict related to the given perturbative situation. In this regard, see Greenacre, 1971),  where,  inter  alia,  the  author  paid  much  attention  to  screen  memories, believing them to be the main path by which early preverbal experiences could be traced.  29  And,  often,  inversions  of  these  relationships  (that  is  to  say,  psychosomatic reifications of thoughts) are at the interpretative basis of the perversions. 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source and a universal character.30 In this phase of the unique genital organ, sexuality is 
put into a crossroad of confusion because both parents are indistinguishable from each 
other and both are fantastically thought to have a penis. This confusion will flow on into 
the latency phase, to be then elaborated according to those different meanings that the 
male and female genitals will assume. The lack of a female penis induces a catastrophic 
fear due to the great importance assigned, in this phase, to the penis; the vagina could 
then be the result of a punishment. So, we are at the culmination of the Œdipus complex, 
with the prevalence of the castration one. The unity of the castration complex in both 
sexes is conceivable only on the basis of a common and primary assumption, precisely 
the one that states the equal and notable importance played by the castration’s object 
(namely, the phallus) both for baby girls and baby boys. The posed problem is the same 
for both, that is to say, have or do not have the phallus. Following Laplanche and Pontalis 
(1973), this castration complex is met in every (psychoanalytic) analysis, and every 
human being experiments with it. Greenacre carried out notable studies on this universal 
character of castration anxiety and human predisposition to anxiety (see Greenacre, 
1971). Furthermore, following Nunberg (1932, 1955, 1975), it is possible to distinguish 
between a passive and an active castration complex in relation respectively to the desire 
to lose or to the fear of losing the unique genital. The manner in which the child copes 
with her or his infantile sexuality and solves the castration complex will determine her or 
his character and psychic health. Such a complex is present, in more or less severe forms, 
in almost all psychic disorders. Finally, following Nunberg (1932, 1955, 1975), in this 
phase takes place the first separation of opposite pairs which, in the previous phases, 
were characterized by a full ambivalence: for instance, in the oral phase, the ambivalence 
appears joined into a unique act, becomes particularly strong in the next anal phase in 
which each libidinal desire must be meant as its opposite, while in the phallic one the two 
opposite tendencies hold next to one another. This last dialectic dynamic tension between 
opposites will be of fundamental importance for symbolic formation.  
 
The Freudian disavowal mechanism and fetishism: brief 
outlines 
First historical outlines on disavowal  
Following Roudinesco (1995), Freud, for the first time, used the term negation or 
denegation31 (Verneinung) in 1917 after a personal re-elaboration of the term negative 
hallucination due to H. Bernheim following his 1914 reclassification of psychoses, 
neuroses and perversions based on castration theory made in On Narcissism: An 
Introduction. The term was then explicitly used by Freud in 1925. By Verneinung Freud 
meant a verbal mechanism through which the repressed material is recognized in a 
negative manner by the subject, but without being accepted. Together with this 
mechanism, Freud also used the term disavowal (Verleugnung) to indicate the refusal, by 
the subject, to recognize the reality of a negative perception, like the lack of a female 
penis. The Verneinung is connected to a mechanism typical of neuroses, whereas the 
Verleugnung is connected to a mechanism typical of perversions. Finally, according to 
Freud, the Verdrängung is a term which indicates a mechanism related to repression. 
Thereafter, in the Wolf Man (of 1914), Freud also used the term Verwerfung to indicate 
                                                30  R.  C.  Bak  has  also  pointed  out  a  possible  universal  character  of  female  genital organs (see also Greenacre, 1971). 31  This denomination was due to J. Hyppolite in the 1950s. 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the rejection of a reality presented as non-existent, and to be meant as distinct from the 
previous ones. In France, there were some heated debates about the relations of the term 
scotomization, first proposed by E. Pichon-Rivière in 1928 to indicate an unconscious 
mechanism through which a subject makes disappear from the consciousness those facts 
which are unpleasant, with the previous terms. For instance, R. Laforgue proposed 
consideration of scotomization as comprising either the Verleugnung and another 
repression mechanism typical of psychoses, whilst Freud considered it as distinct both 
from Verleugnung and Verdrängung. Laforgue wanted to indicate an annulment of a 
perception whilst Freud wished to keep the perception within a framework supported by 
negation, that is to say, not complete closure of a perception in front of a 
misunderstanding of reality, but rather activation of a perception put between a 
denegation and a repression. In a nutshell, the real problem consisted in the lack of a 
specific term to indicate the rejection mechanism typical of psychoses. In short, even 
Freud had a certain moment of uncertainty between all these terms, Verleugnung 
(disavowal), Verdrängung (repression) and Verneinung (negation), in relation to 
psychosis mechanisms. Finally, as we will see later, Freud opted for denegation or 
disavowal. Disavowal (or denial, of the reality), is a term that Sigmund Freud began to 
explicitly use, in a specific sense, after the paper entitled The Negation (of 1925), until it 
attained a more general sense in the last of his works, namely Abriß der Psychoanalyse32 
(see Freud, 1938), even if such a primary notion did not have a definitive 
characterization, for which reason it will be retaken by his followers to be studied more 
deeply. According to Octave Mannoni,33 Freud began to implicitly use the notion of 
disavowal after the 1890s in discussing the concept of splitting the Ego, both these 
notions being closely related to one another. As stated above, disavowal (Verleugnung) is 
different both from negation (Verneinung) and from repression (Verdrängung), as will 
become clear later. Following the last Freudian ideas exposed in Freud (1938, 1949, 
1999), we may consider disavowal as a fundamental psychic mechanism which relies on 
the primary basis of any other possible relation with the external reality. Indeed, in this 
last work of his, Freud fully re-examined all his previous ideas about the Ego agency and 
its functions in the light of the fundamental psychic process of Ego’s splitting. Freud 
(1938, 1949, 1999) also states that a certain degree of fetishism is part of normality, 
particularly during romantic love.34 The above-mentioned Freudian work The Negation 
(of 1925) has played a primary role in subsequent studies on consciousness. Following 
De Mijolla (2005), negation dramatizes a situation of interpretative conflict and is related 
to a dialogical situation. Negation, unknown at the level of the unconscious, needs to be 
situated on a secondary level, and we can gain access to it only by way of the symbol. 
The study of the interrelation between oral instinctual motions and the establishment of 
negative and affirmative behaviour has been further investigated in the works of R. A. 
Spitz (1957). Then, following Akhtar and O’Neil (2011), any elementary content, 
                                                32  This  last  (partially  unfinished)  work  may  be  considered  as  Freud’s  spiritual testament  of  his  (orthodox)  doctrine,  in  which  he  almost  axiomatically  tried  to delineate the main lines of his theory as it historically evolved from its first ideas to the final form together with some of its unsolved questions to which the author was not able to give a relevant answer.  33  See  the  Introduction  to  the  Italian  translation  of  Freud  (1938),  that  is  to  say, Freud (1999). 34  As  we  will  see  later,  this  psychic  phenomenon  is  almost  ubiquitous  in childhood  if  laid  out  in  the Winnicott’s  framework  of  transitional  objects  and their relations with fetish. 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according to Freud, becomes conscious only in its inverted and negated forms. 
Subsequent epistemological analysis (see Chemama & Vandermersch, 1998) have shown 
that 1925 Freud’s work On Negation dwells above all on the disavowal mechanism and 
not only on the negation one, so that his main theses were much more related to the 
former rather than to the latter. On the other hand, with his notion of splitting of the Ego, 
Freud showed his 1938 last thoughts especially concerning fetishism and psychosis. It 
also enlightens his ideas on the basically non-unified structure of the ego. He moreover 
focused on the question of the possible relationships between the Ego agency and the 
reality, introducing another model different from that of repression and of the re-
emersion of the repressed content, by establishing the notion of disavowal as a specific 
psychic mechanism regarding Ego agency (see Bokanowski & Lewkowicz, 2009). The 
initial motivations for the introduction of the disavowal mechanism were mainly due to 
attempts to give a satisfactory explanation of the psychoses which remained until then out 
of the psychoanalytic theoretical framework which was mainly turned to explain the 
neuroses. Roughly speaking, disavowal is a defence mechanism through which the 
individual denies the recognition of painful experiences, impulses, reality data or aspects 
of herself or himself. Such a notion should be understood as a first generalization of a 
particular initial denial, precisely the one experienced by the individual in recognizing 
that traumatic perception which consists in the occurred awareness of the lack of a female 
penis, with consequent supervention of the related castration anxiety. According to the 
initial 1924 Freudian conception, at the first impressions of this lack of a penis, the baby 
boy disavows this absence and imagines to see, in an equal manner, a penis which 
formerly there was but that afterwards has been cut off (castration). According to Freud 
(1938, 1949, 1999), this process seems to be quite normal and widespread in children, but 
it might become dangerous in adult age giving rise either to a psychosis or a paraphilia, 
even if, in these last cases, it is quite unclear in what specific manner these take place. 
Girls, instead, reject the acceptance of the facto datum of their own castration, persisting 
in the conviction of having a penis, being therefore forced, later, to behave as if they were 
males (penis envy35). Subsequently, this first disavowal conception was extended to all 
the painful perceptions which, contrasting with the pleasure principle, lead to not 
recognizing the reality and to transforming it, through hallucinatory modalities, to fulfill 
the desire. Fetishism, besides homosexuality, is the most frequent amongst the paraphilias 
(see Greenacre, 1971) even if it is the most difficult one to diagnose due to the fact that it 
is asymptomatic.  
 
Towards the Ego’s splitting  
The 1927 Freudian paradigm of fetishism, which was initially laid down to explain the 
formation of fetishes by means of castration anxiety due to the observation of the lack of 
a female penis, has gone beyond the context of sexuality, due to the rigour with which it 
was formulated by Freud himself. Subsequently, such a paradigm underwent further 
improvements until a definitive 1938 model centred around the basic notion of Ego’s 
splitting (see Freud, 1938, 1949, 1999). According to the latter, most people overcome 
such a castration complex through symbolic elaboration,36 accepting the gender sexual 
differences, whereas those who do not overcome such a complex will have neurotic 
developments with possible paraphilic degeneration (see also Piscicelli, 1994). In 
                                                35 On this, Lacan will speak of the child as a prolongation of the mother penis. 36 The degree of  this  is directly  correlated with (and proportional  to)  the emotive content associated with it. 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fetishism, the perception that disproves the infant’s belief in a female penis is not rejected 
but is, as some say, displaced upon an object, the fetish. It therefore does not imply a 
hallucination or an alteration of the representation of reality (like in psychoses), but 
simply it repudiates the reality. After having detected the lack of a female penis, the child 
has, in a certain sense, modified its initial belief about the female penis, retaining it and, 
at the same time, abandoning it (Aufgegeben). He or she believes that, despite everything, 
the female has a penis, even if this is no longer that of before, because something has 
taken its place or replaced it, that is to say, it has been named a “symbolic substitute” for 
it upon which it will be possible to cathexis the desire to avoid the strong anxiety’s 
pressures due to the castration principle. But, in doing so, the child inevitably goes into a 
conflict created by the load of the real undesired perception of a penis lack against the 
force of a counter-desire opposed to this, thereby reaching a basic ambivalence whose 
resolutive compromise will be possible only thanks to the action of the unconscious 
thought which dialectically operates through its own primary processes.37 In short, the 
fetish is, yes, a symbolic substitute for the phallus, but it is not always an iconic 
reproduction of it. Such a fetish reflects, at the same time, the denial and the affirmation 
of the female castration, this also corresponding to the coexistence of two opposite 
attitudes in respect of the fetish, which Freud tries to explain by means of a particular 
psychic mechanism, called Ego’s splitting (Ichspaltung). This splitting takes place when 
the child undergoes a conflict between the initial instinct’s claim (Anspruch) and the 
objection made by reality (Einsprunch), but does not choose either one or the other, or 
else chooses both. In such a manner, the formation of the Ego’s synthetic function is 
perturbed. Thus, to sum up, a fundamental characteristic of fetishism is that it allows 
reality to be recognized and, at the same time, disclaimed. It gives rise to the fundamental 
creation of opposites whose separation, thanks to this splitting mechanism (if correctly 
operating), is at the basis of first consciousness formation.38 Such a mechanism, however, 
is different from the psychotic one because the latter is a mere and simple repudiation of 
the reality39 which is never recognized. Nevertheless, the (paraphilic) fetishist cannot 
avoid a degenerative Ego splitting when this splitting does not give rise to that 
compensative symbolic elaboration recalled above.  
 
From fetishism to Ego’s splitting   
On Ego’s splitting, fetishism and transitional phenomena 
By means of the disavowal mechanism, Freud glimpses the origins of an intrasystemic 
Ego’s splitting40 (Ichspaltung) through which, within the Ego agency, two distinct and 
conflictual psychic attitudes take place of which one takes into account the reality denied 
by the other, and substitutes it with the content of a desire. Or else, following Laplanche 
and Pontalis (1973), through this intrapsychic division, an Ego’s splitting takes place both 
                                                37 See Smirnov (1970) and Khan Masud (1970, 1979). 38  The  constitution  and  separation  of  opposite  pairs,  as  already  said,  is  a fundamental  and  characterizing  task  for  consciousness  (see  also  Laplanche  & Pontalis, 1973). Here, we have discussed  such psychodynamic processes  from  the Freudian perspective, but they also play a fundamental role in the Jungian theory of consciousness (in this regard, see also Iurato, 2012). 39  Which has mainly external sources. 40 Which should be kept distinct from the analogous notion related to schizophrenia in which it is preferable to use the term dissociation. 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into a part which observes and into a part which is observed. This last perspective is 
widely but implicitly used by Freud in his final works, above all to denote a certain 
dichotomic or separated nature of human psyche. Throughout this paper, when we refer 
to the notion of Ego’s splitting, we mean this last perspective, coherently with the 
Freudian work in which such a notion starts to be used with the celebrated works 
Fetishism (of 1927), Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence (of 1938) and in Abriß 
der Psychoanalyse (see Freud, 1938). Above all, we will follow the Freudian thought of 
this last work. According to Freud, disavowal would allow us to explain the typical 
features of psychoses and fetishism. Following Galimberti (2006), as stated above, the 
original 1925 Freudian concept of disavowal was extended to all the painful perceptions 
that, being in contrast with the pleasure principle, lead to not recognizing the reality, 
transforming it in a hallucinatory manner to satisfy the desire. Hence, disavowal is a very 
fundamental psychic mechanism which has to do with the external reality, and whose 
main result is this Ego’s splitting. It is the first psychic agency to form for detecting 
reality. The Ego’s splitting is a basic psychic mechanism preliminary to others, like 
introjective and projective identification, etc. Following Greenacre (1971), in the 
formation of Ego’s agency, a remarkable role is played by pre-Œdipus phases. In the 
1930s, there was a considerable need for a deeper knowledge of Ego. In this regard, the 
author, thanks to her professional psychiatrist activity, had the opportunity to examine 
many clinical cases of psychosis which turned out to be of great usefulness just to study 
the Ego’s function. After the studies of W. Hoffer, P. Schilder, M. Ribble, M. E. Fries, R. 
A. Spitz and M. S. Mahler, it had been possible to ascertain that the first formations of 
this agency are of a corporal or somatic nature (bodily Ego). Greenacre herself (and B. 
Lantos) pointed out a certain primitive predisposition to anxiety, mainly related to the 
elaboration of primal scenes, which will play a notable role in the Ego’s formation, if 
properly cathexed, together its next splitting. According to Greenacre, the classical 1927 
and 1938 Freudian works on fetishism were the best ones on fetishism and perversions. 
In these works, Freud foregrounds the Ego’s splitting which takes place in consequence 
of the strong castration anxiety when a child has recognized the gender sexual 
differences. Above all, the kid refuses to recognize the reality of this painful situation. 
Nevertheless, he assigns a penis to his mother, symbolically represented by the fetish 
(material41 or merely symbolic) whose specific form is largely due to the displacement of 
that energetic amount which has been determined in concomitance with the appearance of 
castration anguish. The fetish formation must therefore provide these incongruities in the 
corporal image formation through suitable surrogates. These may be physical parts of the 
body (material fetish) or may be abstract formations like more or less complex fantasies 
(see Greenacre, 1971). The pathological cases mainly take place during the passage from 
the normal childish fetish of three- to four-year-olds to the latency phase, characterized 
by the deterioration of the capacity to establish object relations. In Greenacre (1971), the 
author contributed further interesting considerations on fetishism. According to her, the 
fetish has mainly a phallic meaning, but also a bisexual one. Fetishism is a disorder 
which is mainly due to an imperfect development of corporal image and of the bodily 
Ego, from which derive disorders of reality sense, of identity sense and of object 
relations. The adult’s fetish has something in common with the Winnicott childhood’s 
transitional object which, usually, has a certain role in the constitution and development 
of the reality and of the object relation, and concerns both sexes. The formation of a 
transitional object takes place within the so-called (Winnicott-Spitz) transitional space, 
                                                41  In  this  case,  the  (material)  fetish  may  be  considered  as  a  materialized  screen memory which is related to implicit memory (see Mancia, 2007) or cover memory. 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which is the space around which the mother-child relationship and related transitional 
phenomenology take place (see Vegetti & Finzi, 1976). The persistence in adult age of 
the fetish reveals a chronic defect of psychosomatic structure, while the transitional 
object is usually abandoned with the dawning of genitality, at least in normal cases. In 
most cases, the fetish itself is something of a secret to the fetishist himself (or herself), 
which is strictly related to the primary meaning of the Œdipus complex, that is to say, the 
uncovering of the enigma sphinx, to confirm the basic relationships existing between 
fetish formation and pregenital phases. Following Greenacre (1971), in the phallic phase 
a consolidation of the recognition of genital organs takes place and, in the case of 
disorders and failures in the formation of corporal Ego, the fetish formation may cope 
with this, with a narcissistic reinforcement of Ego itself through it.  
 
On Ego’s Ideal and Ideal Ego  
Following Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), Freud, as mentioned above, put disavowal as 
the main psychic mechanism involved in the Ego’s splitting. He started from the previous 
notion of Spaltung due to J. Breuer and P. Janet, but gradually reached his original 
generically oriented conception to indicate an intrapsychic division, above all in the last 
part of his life, in reference to a splitting of the Ego into an observing part and into an 
observed part. Later, from his above-mentioned 1927 works on fetishism, gradually 
Freud posed the disavowal mechanism at the basis of this splitting phenomenon that he 
wanted, in turn, to put at the basis of psychoses and perversions. Freud pointed out that in 
psychoses a full separation from reality never takes place; in every psychosis, even the 
deeper ones, two antithetic psychic attitudes always exist: the one that takes into account 
the reality in the normal attitude, and the other that, under the drive influence, detaches 
the Ego from reality, giving rise to delirious thoughts. The outcomes of this Ego’s 
splitting are therefore two opposite psychic settings,42 of which each subsists, throughout 
life, alongside the other and never singly of each other, but with the prevalence, from 
time to time, of only one of these two, to the detriment of the other. Out of these, there is 
a normal self-observing component which takes into account the external reality (and is 
prodromic to the formation of the system Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego) mainly through 
opposition to the next subagency (the Ideal Ego), while the other, under the Es’ instinct 
influence, tears out the Ego from the reality (and is prodromic to the unconscious 
formation of the Ideal Ego) assuming a prevalent narcissistic formation on the basis of 
primary identifications as a result of the mother-child relation. According to Nunberg and 
Lagache, the Ideal Ego, genetically prior to the Super-Ego, is the first Ego’s component 
to be formed from the symbiotic mother-child state, upon which the subject will build up 
her or his further psychic development, and to which he or she comes back in psychotic 
states (and not only in these). According to Lagache, the Ideal Ego has sadomasochistic 
implications: in particular, hand in hand with Ideal Ego starting its formation, the 
negation of the Other, by the pair Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego, is correlative to the 
affirmation of Self, thus giving rise to opposite pair formation and to the next separation 
of their elements (consciousness process). Thus, following Laplanche and Pontalis 
(1973), we have two basic Ego’s psychic components, the one that observes (Ego’s Ideal 
                                                42 Which might be considered as forming the first precursor of an opposite pair (or else  the  source  of  any  other  possible  philosophical  pair),  which  will  play  a fundamental role in the dialectic reasoning, as already stated above. 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– Super-Ego) and the other that is observed (Ideal Ego43). Human psychic behaviour will 
be the dialectic result of the concomitant action of these two opposite and inseparable, 
but independent from each other, Ego’s (sub)agencies, hence by the prevalence of one of 
these two upon the remaining one. There is, however, always dialectic interaction44 
between them. Freud put this splitting mechanism at the psychodynamic basis of 
psychoses and other disorders (including neuroses), justifying the assumption of such a 
mechanism as one of the main dynamic processes of psychic formation, which basically 
allows us to relate ourselves to reality. In short, the basic opposition between the 
(narcissistic) Ideal Ego and the (social) Ego’s Ideal is the early source of any further 
dialectic process. Furthermore, within the Lacanian work, disavowal has been the first 
psychic mechanism involved in a complex epistemological evolution that reached the 
composite notion of forclusion which lies at the basis of the celebrated binomial O/o (that 
is, discourse of the Other versus discourse of the other) that Lacan derives from the 
previous binomial Ideal Ego/Ego’s Ideal. As mentioned above, these two Ego’s 
components are not present in the Freudian thought, which introduced only the notion of 
Ego’s Ideal and to which was brought back then the notion of Super-Ego. The history of 
the pair Ideal Ego-Ego’s Ideal has undergone quite a hard-working evolutionary history. 
Following Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), Freud introduced the notion of Ego’s Ideal in 
On Narcissism. An Introduction (of 1914) to indicate an agency as resulting from the 
convergence of infantile narcissism and omnipotence (which will form the idealizations 
of the Ego) and the parental (hence social) agencies and identifications; later, first in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (of 1921), then in The Id and the Ego (of 
1923), the Ego’s Ideal was identified with the Super-Ego agency, whose function is put in 
the foreground in the formation of critical sense, of prohibition and self-observation 
agencies and of interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic literature 
identifies a certain difference between the Super-Ego agency and the Ego’s Ideal one 
even if they overlap one another somewhat. The system Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego is, 
however, related to social and prohibition agencies as well as to self-observation, moral 
and critical functions, even if there is no unanimous consensus in the respective 
attribution of these. As early as On Narcissism. An Introduction (of 1914) Freud used the 
term Ideal Ego but substantially as synonymous with Ego’s Ideal. These subagencies 
would be retaken by H. Nunberg in 1932 (of which we will outline some related ideas in 
the next subsection) and, in 1958, by D. Lagache, who indentifies a main opposition 
between the Ideal Ego and the system Ego’s Ideal-Super-Ego. According to Lagache, the 
Ideal Ego has a narcissistic character of omnipotence which is mainly due to a primary 
                                                43  These  two  Ego’s  agencies,  as  the  results  of  an  intrasystemic  agency  separation (the Ego’s splitting), play a  fundamental role  in Lacan’s  theoretical  framework. We would also want to suggest  the hypothesis according to which the  first bodily Ego formations (the  first ones that have external reality’s preconscious apprehension), and  from which will  form  the  Ego’s  Ideal  –  Super‐Ego  agency  system, might  have their neurobiological counterpart in the mirror neuron systems or however related with  them.  For  instance,  the  latter  are  compromised  in  individuals  with  autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) (see Perkins, et al., 2010). Following Ritvo and Provence (1954), children with ASDs show disturbances in the area of human‐object relations, relations with toys and playthings, mobility patterns and language, and all this will turn  out  to  be  coherent  with  what  we  will  say  later  about  the  bodily  image formation and  its  impairments.  In any  case,  these  systems will  surely play a basic role in the formation of Ideal Ego agency as it has been defined above. 44  Which is not present in psychoses. 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identification with the mother; it is irreducible to the Ego’s Ideal agency, and its 
formation has sadomasochistic implications, including the negation of the Other in 
correlation to the affirmation of Self, on the basis of the main opposition between the 
Ideal Ego and the Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego system. But, following Roudinesco (1995), it 
was Jacques Lacan that, in 1954, without quoting Nunberg, in his own way considered 
these two Ego subagencies as distinct from each other, putting them at the foundation of 
his theoretical framework, highlighting their relevant nature and function. The Ideal Ego 
is a narcissistic formation belonging to the imaginary register and formed during the 
mirror stage (theorized by Lacan in 1936), whereas the Ego’s Ideal refers to a symbolic 
function that is able to organize the set of the relationships of the subject with others. The 
institution of the dualism O/o is therefore a consequence of the establishment of the 
dualism Ego’s Ideal/Ideal Ego. In this system, Lacan laid out the celebrated Lévi-
Straussian splitting from nature to culture operated by universal incest prohibition 
because this allowed Lacan to conceive a basic opposition between the symbolic function 
of the Father (corresponding to the Ego’s Ideal or to the Other), representing the culture 
and incarnation of the law, and the imaginary position of the Mother (from whom derives 
the Ideal Ego or the other), depending on the order of Nature and destined to merge with 
the child meant as the phallic object of a missing penis. It is thanks to the mirror stage 
that the Œdipus phase starts, in such a manner that, through the paternal metaphor (name-
of-the-father), the child is separated from the mother, giving rise to the Ego’s Ideal 
formation. Therefore, it is just by naming the missing mother penis – that is to say, the 
child – by means of the paternal metaphor (the phallus) that the symbolic register takes 
place (Ego’s Ideal or Other or signifier), which is related to a secondary process, through 
disengaging from the imaginary register (the Ideal Ego or other or signified), which is 
strictly related to the primary process. The consequent lack of being, due to this 
disengaging from the mother womb,45 creates, amongst other things, the unsatisfiable 
desire of the other of the imaginary order which will try to be satisfied with other 
maternal substitutes that she or he will find in the symbolic order of the Other. The 
symbolic register will allow her or himself to be perceived and recognized from the Ideal 
Ego to the Ego’s Ideal, that is to say, through the symbol, whose notion starts from C. 
Lévi-Strauss and F. de Saussure’s structuralistic theories. However, for Lacan, what is 
fundamentally important is the signifier structure of the symbolic order and not the link 
of symbol with the symbolized (or signified), which concerns with the imaginary order, 
as in Freud.  
 
An outline of Hermann Nunberg’s Ego’s psychology  
The little-known work of Hermann Nunberg (1932, 1955, 1975) contains a great number 
of new ideas and insights on psychoanalysis besides being one of the most important 
                                                45    Just  at  this point occurs  the  forclusion,  a  specific Lacanian  splitting mechanism based  on  reality’s  rejection  (Verwerfung)  and  derived  both  from  the  Freudian 
spaltung  and  from  Laforgue  and  Pichon‐Rivière’s  scotomization.  This  mechanism roughly consists in the primordial rejection of a fundamental signifier (the name‐of‐the‐father, hence the symbolic phallus) out of the symbolic register of the subject, so giving rise to a psychotic state. Therefore, the (symbolic) phallus is a cornerstone of Lacanian  theory  basically  because  it  is  the  primordial  symbol  to  enter  into  the symbolic order. Hence,  also  in  the Lacan  theory of  the  symbolic,  the phallus, with related castration phenomena, plays a fundamental role (see Recalcati, 2003). 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treatises46 on orthodox psychoanalytic theory, as remembered by Freud himself in his 
preface to this work. For our purposes, we only recall here some points of his work which 
may have some usefulness for what is expounded here. For instance, in Nunberg (1932, 
1955, 1975), a clear and complete discussion of Ego psychology is presented, of which 
we here outline those main points that are useful for our studies. In it, the primary role of 
bodily Ego is highlighted, understood as the first central core around which will revolve 
and build up all the following representations. The perception is the first and basic 
element for establishing the reality exam which develops with great slowness but on 
which will depend all the following psychic formation. The Ego will accomplish both 
internal and external requests, with a suitable right energy distribution. According to 
Nunberg, the Ego initially is in an unorganized phase within the Id, whose delimitation 
identifies a subagency called Ideal Ego, which has a full narcissistic and omnipotent 
character turned only toward the satisfaction of the own needs.47 During the psychic 
development, this subagency gradually leaves its role in place of the other rising 
subagency called the Ego’s Ideal, even if, particularly in psychotic states, the individual 
intends to come back to the Ideal Ego when fantasies of “coming back to the maternal 
womb” predominate. Children and schizophrenics have great difficulty in disengaging 
from their strong narcissistic and omnipotent Ideal Ego which has an unconscious nature 
and is ruled by the principle of pleasure, trying to satisfy every need also in a 
hallucinatory manner in case of non-immediate satisfaction. Hence, the main defence 
mechanisms of Ideal Ego are negation, projection and hallucination to avoid any 
unpleasantness. Nevertheless, in normality, it is not always possible to disregard the 
reality, thus giving rise to the formation of the reality principle, which is often mediated 
by the thought. Between the perception of reality and the action adapted to the perceived 
reality gradually the thought is inserted, which prepares the action, eventually 
substituting it. The judgment function of negation, according to Freud, is the first 
transition step from ignorance to recognition. To be precise, recognition takes place 
thanks to a state of spiritual protection which seeks stimuli from the external world 
which, in turn, will be apperceived and accepted by the Ego. Therefore, recognition 
undergoes the influx of impulses which are aimed at establishing a link with the external 
world and its objects, drawing its energy from life instincts. Ignorance, instead, comes 
from a state which feels the stimuli of the external world as unpleasant, so perturbing the 
ever desiderated quite. Thus, the Ego definitively closes the perceptive system against 
them. Negation, instead, takes a further step, in the sense that it recognizes what is 
unpleasant, and, at the same time, eliminates, expels and annihilates (in the unconscious) 
all that. Ignorance and negation are energetically supported by death instincts. Therefore, 
the relationships between the external and internal world are ruled by the interplay 
between life and death instincts by means of the own bodily image and its borders. The 
gradual adaptation to reality takes place to inhibit the aggressiveness (Thanatos) through 
life instincts (Eros) which provide energy for libidinal investments of the first object 
relationships. In this regard, Nunberg considers the depersonalization states and 
schizophrenia as patterns to infer as a reality sense starts to form. In pursuing this, as we 
will see, the last 1938 Freudian thought seems to be re-evoked. In both cases, there is a 
retirement of libido from the lost-love object to which are also associated the world’s 
destruction feelings with related aggressiveness tendencies that Nunberg attributes to the 
                                                46  Together the well‐known treatise of O. Fenichel (1945). 47  Subsequently,  D.  Lagache  will  bring  back  this  subagency  to  the  maternal predominance  or  to  the  phallic  mother.  He  brings  back  to  it  possible  delinquent behaviours. 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anxieties of castration. Furthermore, in these pathological cases, Nunberg detected a 
certain increase of narcissistic components that he would want to bring back to an 
identification of the Ego with the phallus due to the retirement of the libidinal cathexis 
from objects to the Ego, with consequent loss of the reality sense. Therefore, Nunberg 
deduces two main consequences: first, that the recognition of reality takes place thanks to 
a certain capacity of the Ego to turn the libido toward external objects; second, that there 
is a component of the Ego that does not want to recognize the perceived reality, 
notwithstanding this is just perceived. It seems that this part of the Ego does not want to 
know of the perceptions, notwithstanding these are rightly perceived. And the remaining 
perceiving part of the Ego seems as well to be suffering from this denial. Therefore, there 
are two subagencies of the Ego, one that perceives and acts, the other that judges the 
Ego’s experiences which need to be approved in order that these may have a sense of 
reality. This might explain why it is immoral to deny the reality and not instead say the 
truth. Thus, Nunberg deepens this self-observing and critical agency of Ego which is 
located in the preconscious system. The first bodily Ego’s percepts will be undergone to 
the critical and observational modalities of the Ego. They will be recognized or denied 
according to modalities which have no sensorial character and are absent in schizophrenic 
patients where a deep self-observation prevails, but not over percepts of the external 
world. In normality, the perceiving and self-observing Ego’s subagencies harmonically 
and constructively co-operate with the critical one; often, these two Ego’s subagencies 
are not easily distinguishable inasmuch as they overlap with one another, becoming quite 
differentiated or separated only when a conflict arises between them. These critical and 
self-observing agencies will form the substrate to the next merely psychic Super-Ego 
agency, which will reach its most complete formation with the end of the Œdipus 
complex. The Super-Ego will begin to intervene between the Id and the narcissistic Ideal 
Ego agencies, making itself bearer of the social and reality agencies; it will be the result 
of successive identifications but, in turn, it is also susceptible to influences from the first 
ones. Nevertheless, this mediation role is often failed by the Super-Ego because of its 
extreme difficulty in conciliating the Id and Ideal Ego agencies. Nevertheless, Nunberg 
highlights that both life and death instincts contribute to determining the structure of the 
Super-Ego. To be precise, its structure mainly stems from the inhibition of immediate 
instinctual satisfaction to account for reality needs, and this may take place both from 
death and life instincts. The death instincts concur to determine such an inhibition of the 
rigid, prohibitive and authoritarian structure of the Super-Ego, whereas the life instincts 
concur to determine another particular structure classified as Ego’s Ideal, which is carried 
out as follows. When, for love,48 one gives in to an instinctual satisfaction for fear of 
losing a loved object, the latter will be taken on into the Ego domain and cathexed by the 
libido, so becoming a part of Ego which will be called Ego’s Ideal. It is for love of her or 
his own ideal that the individual remains emotionally bound to it and undergoes to its 
requests. So, the Ego obeys both the Super-Ego for fear of a punishment and Ego’s Ideal 
for love. This last love is not sexual because it is the outcome of a transformation of an 
object libido into an Ego’s libido, so that a desexualization takes place, that is to say, a 
sublimation,49 so that the narcissism of Ego’s Ideal has a secondary nature (because it is 
linked to a secondary process), while that of the Ideal Ego is a narcissism having a 
primary nature. According to Nunberg, the system Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego provides the 
                                                48   Here, when one speaks of love, we refer to the wider general sense of this term, not only to the sensual one.  49 Subsequently, J. Chasseguet‐Smirgel (1985) identified various possible outcomes for the Ego’s Ideal, perverse as well as creative. 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representation of the external world to the Ego. Therefore, instinctual renunciations may 
take place either for hate or for fear of a punishment and for love, so that the dual system 
Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego is characterized by an ambiguous or ambivalent nature moulded 
on the fundamentally opposite love-hate pair. Nunberg puts in evidences the historical 
evolution of these notions since the Freudian work: indeed, as stated above, Freud mainly 
conceived the Ego’s Ideal as being synonymous with Super-Ego, hence pointing out its 
prohibitive agencies and not the loving aspects. Instead, Nunberg retook the system Ego’s 
Ideal – Super-Ego and deepened the distinction between these two agencies, although it is 
very difficult to descry a net distinction between them. According to Nunberg, the Ego’s 
Ideal has mainly a maternal libido, while the Super-Ego has mainly a paternal libido, 
even if there is a certain merger of both. The Ego’s Ideal, due to its mainly maternal 
nature, starts to form from pregenital phases, while the Super-Ego, due to its mainly 
paternal nature, starts to form during the genital phase because of the castration fear 
which puts at risk the whole Ego due to its genital identification. The Super-Ego is 
responsible for the sense of guilt, while the Ego’s Ideal is responsible for the sense of 
inferiority. Nunberg stresses the complexity of the system Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego, the 
first subagency being provided by life instincts and characterized by a prevalence of love 
while the second subagency is underpinned by death instincts and mainly ruled by 
severity, austerity and by a general asceticism just to stem these destructive instincts. The 
internal structure of this system is quite complex and variously subdivided into itself, 
with continuous oscillations from one component to another: for agency, in certain cases 
the more severe Super-Ego may prevail, in others the rather milder Ego’s Ideal may 
prevail. The Ego will therefore accomplish control, mediation and synthetic functions in 
regard to the various requests coming from all these agencies, namely the Id, Ego’s Ideal 
– Super-Ego and Ideal Ego, which are mostly in opposition with each other.  
 
On fetishism: first outlines 
From the epistemological viewpoint, Freud reached the conception of an Ego’s splitting 
by studying a particular psychopathological model, that of fetishism. This is mainly 
meant to be a male perversion in which there is no recognition of the female penile lack 
since this is a fact that, if it were denied, would turn out to be potentially anxiogenic 
because of the castration complex which is experienced by most people (due to its 
universal character, as recalled above). He (or she50) therefore recuses his (or her) own 
sensorial perception51 which has shown to him (or her) that the female genital apparatus 
lacks a penis, firmly keeping to the opposite conviction. Nevertheless, this denied 
perception does not remain without any psychic consequence since he (or she) does not 
have the courage, or the dishonesty, to affirm seeing a penis, unless he (or she) stays in a 
psychotic state. Thus, to compensate for this, he (or she) either turns towards a further 
general symbolic elaboration52 (as in most normal cases) or clings to something more 
material, like a part of the body or an object to which he (or she) ascribes the penis role or 
                                                
50    We  have  intentionally  given  precedence  to  males  over  females  because  these phenomena  mainly  concern  the  former,  although  not  exclusively.  Only  for  this reason  have  we  put  the  female  third  person  individual  pronoun  “she”  within brackets.  
51  Which still turns out to be not compromised.  
52    Considering  this  in  the  general  framework describing  the  crucial  passage  from nature  to  culture,  that  is  to  say,  we  regard  the  symbolic  function  as  the  main landmark of this. Sublimation therefore has to be meant as a consequence of it. 
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considers it to be acting as a material symbolic replacement for this. All that (fetish 
creation) is due to the fact that he (or she) does not admit this lack of a penis, 
notwithstanding the evidence thereof. However, Freud (1938, 1949, 1999) himself 
pointed out that this fetish creation does not provide the exact paradigm of the Ego’s 
splitting mechanism, since the former belongs to the proper psychopathological context 
whereas the castration complex, with its possible effects (including this Ego splitting), 
basically concerns normality – that is to say, it concerns every human being, as we shall 
see later – but without excluding possible pathological degenerations (just like in 
fetishism). Subsequently, Freud was led to consider disavowal (as already seen, 
essentially based on castration anxiety) as concerning, in pathological cases, the full 
recusation of external reality by the psychotic, as opposed to the repression carried out by 
the neurotic. Indeed, the former completely recuses the external reality (due to a 
structural deficit of the pair Ego’s Ideal – Super-Ego), whereas the latter removes the 
(internal) Es’ needs. In the first case, as already said, we have an Ego splitting (with a 
complete prevalence of the narcissistic Ideal Ego) that is different from other splitting 
phenomena due to the neurotic repression, because the latter concerns an internal conflict 
between two distinct agencies, the Ego against the Es, in regard to an internal (and not 
external) reality. Hence, only the former has some relationship with the external world, 
and Freud put it at the source of every other form of disavowal of reality that yet may be 
symbolically reconceived or rebuilt up. Thus, disavowal mainly has to do with primary 
relationships between these two Ego’s subagencies, the Ideal Ego and the Ego’s Ideal – 
Super-Ego, due to the above-mentioned Ego splitting.53 
 
On negation, fetishism and linguistics 
First linguistic implications  
Following Galimberti (2006), negation (Verneinung) has to do with the conscious 
emersion of repressed material in a negative form in respect of that presented at the 
moment in which such a content was repressed. Hence, through negation, which is a 
mechanism laying out into the class of repression phenomena, it will be possible to make 
conscious a repressed content. Freud introduced such a notion in 1925, distinguishing it 
from that of disavowal but with which it has close relations. Indeed, according to Thass-
Thienemann (1967), a strict correlation exists between grammatical negations and the 
Freudian concept of disavowal discussed above. After a detailed historic-epistemological 
comparative analysis of various grammatical negation terms, according to Thass-
Thienemann, their negativistic character subtends an anal aggressive element, in which it 
is possible to descry the verbal expression of one of the greatest events of the child 
emotive-affective development, namely that concerning the discovery of sexual 
differences,54 with all the correlated intense anxious emotive charges which will be at the 
energetic basis for the incipiency of other basic psychodynamic mechanisms, like that of 
repression and disavowal.55 The author, in this regard, quotes the almost universally 
                                                
53   Which  is  a mechanism  in  some  respects  quite  similar  to  the  above‐mentioned 
scotomization of E. Pichon‐Rivière and R. Laforgue (see Rycroft, 1968a).  54   It’s not by chance that the common language of children (and not only them) is full of references to genital organs.  55    Which  will  become  operative  in  the  subsequent  phallic  phase.  In  this  regard, therefore, it is noteworthy to highlight this strict and fundamental link between the 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known stories and tales whose leitmotiv are goblins, or little spirits, which often 
disappear in such a way that it is impossible to establish whether they are present or not. 
Since a little goblin is clearly a phallic symbol, all that means that sometimes the little 
penis is missing and at other times it is present, reflecting the primeval infantile 
observation experienced by a child in noting gender anatomical differences. We are at the 
border between the anal phase and the phallic one. Therefore, this being-there and not-
being-there (and that, in part, recalls M. Heidegger’s thought) correspond to the first 
child fantasies in observing this, which thereafter will unconsciously mould the fantasies 
of verbal negation. This duality between ‘being-there’ and ‘not-being-there’ has also been 
one of the main themes of Soren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger’s philosophies, 
whose ontological theories of nothing are at the basis of existential anguish as a human 
response to nothing. Again according to Thass-Thienemann, there is not much difference 
between the metaphysical interpretation of anguish and the metapsychological one. But 
the latter is but the castration anxiety due, as already said, to the ascertainment of the 
female penile lack, so that, in conclusion, the philosophical nothing is but the abstract 
elaboration of the “nothing” perceived during the childhood in the moment of seeing the 
related gender anatomical differences, that is to say, the bewilderment, the astonishment 
and the disbelief of a child before the “nothing” of a woman (in seeing her genital 
setting); however, this appreciable, even if little known, work of Thass-Thienemann on 
negation will receive further confirmation later. On the other hand, following Nunberg 
(1975), the language originates from sexual instincts (as stated by H. Sperber) as well as 
being a substitute for actions having a desexualized meaning, so that it is the result of a 
sublimation process which has taken place in the first phases of psychosexual 
development. Nunberg recalls a fact drawn from the autobiography of the Russian writer 
and dramatist Maksim Gor’kij (1868-1936) who wrote that, after having taught a farmer 
to read, the latter exclaimed that he was astonished by the possibility that a thing, while 
not being there, it is as if was there.  
 
Other linguistic implications  
Taking into account what has been said above, the Freudian psychosexual development 
may play a central role in the foundation and behaviour of a certain primary psychic 
grammar on the basis of the above oppositions which seem to develop during the passage 
from the anal phase to the phallic one, thanks to the action of the disavowal mechanism. 
The linguistic function is one of the main symbolic systems of communication amongst 
human beings. It takes place during and parallel to the specific phases of Freudian 
psychosexual development herein considered. In this framework, two main basic rules 
can be identified, namely: 
 
a) Separation of opposites. As we know, in the unconscious domain prevails a 
symmetric principle (see the work of I. Matte Blanco, briefly recalled in Iurato (2013) 
through which a statement with its negation may be valid. Within it, it is not possible to 
have a distinction between the elements of an opposite pair, so that, for example, there is 
no distinction between “I” and “not-I” (or Me and not-Me). Following Laplanche and 
Pontalis (1973), Freud, for the first time, spoke of opposites in regard to perversions in 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (of 1905), stating that some of these take place 
through pairs of opposites, and this fact has a great importance from the theoretical 
                                                                                                                                       anal phase and the subsequent one, the phallic phase, in which a unification of the previous partial instincts will take place under the control of genital organs. 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viewpoint. From here on, the notion will be present almost everywhere in all of Freud’s 
work. The opposite elements of such a pair are irreducible each to the other, thus giving 
rise to a psychic conflict which will be overcome only through a dialectic process. With 
the separation of the primary opposite elements (I, not-I), through the Ego’s splitting 
(from the disavowal mechanism), it will then be possible to attain the first rudiments of 
otherness, with the formation of “you”, “he” and “she”. These are the first steps towards 
the formation of the own identity in respect to the otherness. In doing so, the identity and 
symmetric principles take place, which are two elementary principles of Aristotelian 
logic. To be precise, the main elementary Boolean logic operators, upon which relies 
elementary logic, are conjugation, negation, disjunction, material implication and 
biconditional implication. Nevertheless, C.S. Peirce proved that all five of these operators 
can be derived from only two primitives, namely conjugation and negation (see Akhtar 
and O’Neil, 2011; and references therein). 
 
b) Symbolic formation. After the separation of opposites, in the unconscious realm, a 
dialectic synthesis of their dynamic opposition can be attained through symbolic 
elaboration. For instance, from the previous opposition process, it is possible to have 
identifications56 of the type “not-penis = vagina” and “vagina = castration” (the vagina’s 
emptiness being the result of a castration and therefore inducing a consequent castration 
anxiety), from which it follows the very crucial painful identification “not-penis = 
castration”, which is what is effectively observed during the passage from the anal to the 
phallic phase, until the Œdipus complex. Hence, if this last concatenation process takes 
place, then the achievement of the transitivity principle is possible. On the other hand, 
that the penis and the vagina might form a primordial opposite pair is simply due to the 
opposed anatomic-geometrical constitution. Then, within Lacan’s framework, the 
phallus, as the main signifier which will distribute the various signified, institutes a first 
difference between have or not have, which will constitute the first primordial step from 
the imaginary order to the symbolic one.  
 
In particular, from the conclusion given by the last pivotal identification “not-penis = 
castration”, a certain more or less strong anxiety follows (of castration, stronger in males 
for obvious reasons) whose consequent affective-emotive energetic charge must be 
cathexed to avoid such an anguish. From here, the disavowal mechanism starts to operate 
in its stronger action. Therefore, the possible solutions are mainly twofold: a fetishistic 
(material) degeneration or a symbolic elaboration, both of which are oriented to 
desperately find such a penis lacking in females. In normal cases, the symbolic 
elaboration is the first step towards the institution of every other following human 
symbolic process. En passant, we observe that the above a) and b) processes are at the 
early origins of the elementary logical thought (in its Aristotelian form): indeed, from 
them follow the identity, symmetry and transitivity principles by which, in turn, follows 
dialectic reasoning,57 through the building up of the naïve set theory in its Boolean form, 
thus obtaining the elementary propositional algebra of Aristotelian logic (see Iurato, 
2013). On the other hand, following Greenacre (1971), the fetish represents the substitute 
for the maternal phallus in which the child had first believed and which he (or she) does 
not want to renounce, keeping, therefore, his (or her) initial idea thanks to the fetish, at 
                                                56  Such  identifications  are  now  possible  through  the  action  of  the  previous separation  process  thanks  to which  an  identity  principle  is  available.  From  it,  the identification and discrimination processes are functional to their aims.  57  See Lombardo Radice (1965). 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the cost of a violent denial of reality. The fetish is the symbol of triumph at the threat of 
castration and a protection from it. According to Freud, fetishists have a sort of double 
image of female castration, that is to say, the fetish, at the same time, denies and affirms 
the existence of castration, thus giving rise to opposite attitudes. Therefore, the symbol 
(that is to say, the fetish) is usually what may reunite in itself (or put together) the 
opposites, in line with the original etymological meaning of symbol and with what has 
been said at points a) and b). This is what Freud himself claims, to confirm what we have 
said above. Subsequently Freud focused his attention on fetishism in relation to the 
reality sense and to the Ego’s splitting, as we have outlined above. Indeed, the castration 
anxiety gives rise to a conflict between the instinctual demand (due to the pleasure 
principle) and the reality domain, in which the child does not want to renounce the 
gratification but at the same time he (or she) does not deny the reality, inducing two 
opposite reactions which will be at the centre of the next Ego’s splitting. This is the early 
origin of dialectic reasoning. According to R. C. Bak, the symbolic meaning of fetish is 
due to condensation processes put in place during pregential phases (namely, the phallic 
and Œdipus ones). Again according to Greenacre (1971), the fetish is the key to a hesitant 
genitality. It should satisfy stability, visibility and tangibility requirements, as well as be 
able to symbolize the penis and its opposite (whence a)). Then in Greenacre (1971), the 
reverential fear reactions in childhood mainly start at the end of the Œdipus phase as a 
result of the previous strong penis reverential awe during the phallic phase which implies, 
at the same time, fear and admiration of the penis itself. These contrasting phallic images 
often remain in adult life, and might be put into relation with what is said in the above 
point a). These last discussions are also linkable with creative attitudes, as we will see 
later. Hermann58 (1989) gives a psychoanalytic explanation of the above-mentioned basic 
logic principles on the basis of the Œdipus complex. But, on the basis of his clinical case, 
Hermann also introduced another psychic mechanism, called dual procedure, that he 
wanted to bring back to the castration anxiety and that will provide every dualistic feature 
of thought. Hermann puts it at the basis of his framework, even trying to explain the 
Œdipus complex through it. On the other hand, Hermann himself states that the logical 
thought comes from a pre-existent primitive thought that he calls totemic mentality, that 
is to say, he wants to consider a totemic origin of logical thought, so that the latter has a 
substantial fetishistic nature.  
 
On embodied linguistics  
On the basis of the previous work of I. Matte Blanco on the inextricable relationships 
between symmetric and asymmetric thought (which comprise those related to emotion 
and rational thought), the analysis of the relationships between primordial thought 
language (like those experienced in altered states of consciousness) and cognitive 
linguistic features (like syntactic structures and creativity), as discussed in Cariola 
(2012), show what primary role the body boundary awareness elements have in primary 
conscious acts, like the right perception and usage of space-time categories and those 
regarding the right separation between Me and not-Me, the latter playing a fundamental 
role in consciousness development, as Freud himself stated. As regards, then, what is said 
at point a), a further confirmation that separation of opposites takes place during the 
passage from the phallic phase to the Œdipus one comes from Cuccio (2011, 2012) and 
references therein, where, essentially, it is said that the first forms of linguistic negation 
are acquired between two and a half years old and three years old, and that these play a 
                                                58 The original paper dates back to 1924. 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very basic role in human cognitive development. We textually report what is said in 
Cuccio (2011, p. 48), namely: 
 
 
 By looking at first-language learning in infancy, we can see […] three steps in the 
acquisition of linguistic negation: 1) rejection/refusal; 2) disappearance/non-
existence/unfulfilled expectation; 3) denial. According to many studies, […] rejection 
is the first category of negation to be acquired. Children use “no” to express refusal of 
something existing in their present context. However, we can find examples of 
rejection in human pre-linguistic gestures and even in animal behaviour. In fact, before 
the time children start to produce the single word “no” to express rejection, they have 
already expressed rejection non-linguistically. Rejection […] does not require abstract 
mental representations, while non-existence and denial do require them. The second 
category of linguistic negation to arise is non-existence/unfulfilled expectation. At this 
point, children are able to signal the absence or disappearance of an expected referent 
in the context of speech or indicate something that violates their expectations, based 
on previous experience (for instance, malfunctioning toys). Lastly, the third category 
to be acquired is denial. Denial implies negation of a predication. The referent is 
usually symbolically expressed. […] To deny, children must have the ability to discern 
between their own knowledge of the world and the knowledge of their listener. In 
order to deny a sentence, children have to manage with two propositions, one 
affirming and one negating the same predication; and they have to ascribe one of them 
to the person they are speaking to. “To deny the truth of another person’s statement 
entails the understanding that the other person may hold different beliefs, or that 
language is itself a representation of reality, not reality itself” [...]. Denial is usually 
acquired by the age of two and a half years. […] Categories of negation are acquired 
according to the complexity of the inferences that they entail. At the beginning, 
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children are only able to make inferences about the present perceptual situation. Thus, 
at first, children can only negate (rejecting, prohibiting or expressing non-existence) 
something currently present in the perceptual context of speech or something that just 
before was present in the speech context. Later on, as children start to express denial, 
they become able to read their listener presuppositions. At this time, children rely both 
on perceptual and pragmatic context. 
 
It is clearly possible to establish parallels between the non-existence and denial processes 
of the above and the disavowal mechanism which we have considered. According to 
Cuccio (2011), negation is a typical universal future of human language and there is no 
known animal communication system that has negation. The acquisition of linguistic 
negation is a fundamental step in human cognitive development. Following Cuccio 
(2011, p. 47): 
 
 
 Many studies carried out during these last decades have been looking at the 
acquisition of negation in first-language learning […]. All of them seem to agree on 
the opinion that the acquisition of linguistic negation is a fundamental step in 
cognitive development. According to Spitz (1957), the ability “to say no” is the most 
important achievement of first infancy. In fact, by saying “no” children, for the first 
time, are symbolically expressing an abstract concept (see D’Aniello, 1989; Spitz, 
1957). The use of negation requires complex cognitive abilities. As psycholinguistic 
research has shown, in order to use negation children need to know the difference 
between their own mental representations and the external world; they need to know 
the difference between their own mental representations and the mental 
representations of the person they are speaking to; moreover, in complex forms of 
negation, children cannot entirely rely on a present perceptual scene but instead they 
need to manage their listeners’ beliefs and other epistemic states. Thus, although the 
expression of negation is acquired very early in infancy (before children learn to talk, 
in fact prelinguistic infants can reject something by using gestures or by shaking their 
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head), negation is all but cognitively simple. Of course, linguistic negation is far more 
complex than its non-linguistic expression; still “no” is acquired very early on, being 
one of the first words in language acquisition. Psycholinguists have been identifying 
the different semantic categories of negation that emerge during cognitive and 
linguistic development. The number of these categories increases or decreases 
depending on the criteria of classification adopted in each study. However, although 
there is not a general agreement, we will see that the functions and the order of 
appearance in these studies are roughly the same. 
 
On the other hand, linguistic negation is a metalinguistic operator because it cannot be 
referentially used, and this is a remarkable fact for the development of consciousness 
because, amongst other things, this operator entails a second-order mental representation. 
Finally, following Cuccio (2011), it has been observed that ASD subjects are unable to 
use a correct linguistic negation, coherently with what will be said in the following Part 
2. Thereafter, in Cuccio (2012), interesting relations between embodiment and linguistic 
functions are highlighted on the basis of the prominent discovery of the mirror neuron 
system which has given scientific proof that language and cognition are embodied. We 
now follow Cuccio (2012, p. 2) (who, in part, revisits what is said in her previous 2011 
work):  
 
 
 According to many studies […] rejection is the first category of negation to be 
acquired. Children use “no” to express refusal of something existing in their present 
context. Before the time children start to produce the single word “no” to express 
rejection, they have already expressed rejection non-linguistically. Rejection […] does 
not require abstract mental representations, while non-existence and denial do require 
them. The second category of linguistic negation to arise is non-existence/unfulfilled 
expectation. At this point, children are able to signal the absence or disappearance of 
an expected referent in the context of speech or to indicate something that violates 
their expectations, based on previous experience (for instance, malfunctioning toys). 
Lastly, the third category to be acquired is denial. Denial implies negation of a 
predication. The referent is usually symbolically expressed. […] To deny children 
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must have the ability to discern between their own knowledge of the world and the 
knowledge of their listener. In order to deny a sentence, children have to deal with two 
propositions, one affirming and one negating the same predication; and they have to 
ascribe one of these to the person they are speaking to. To deny the truth of another 
person’s statement entails the understanding that the other person may hold different 
beliefs, or that language is itself a representation of reality, not reality itself […]. 
Denial is usually acquired by the age of two and a half years. 
 
Clearly, there are many interesting points which lend themselves to being explained by 
means of what is proposed in this paper and that might be the aim of a further in-depth 
study. The importance of negation in logic and in all scientific inquiry is also reconfirmed 
by B.E. Litowitz in Akhtar and O’Neil (2011), where a complete and in-depth review of 
the already made psycholinguistic researches on rejection, refusal and denial59 is 
presented in the light of psychoanalytic perspectives. To these last linguistic arguments, 
namely of the possible explanatory potential which might have the theoretical pattern 
here considered and based on the disavowal mechanism (considered to be a general 
psychodynamic mechanism), it will therefore be necessary to return later. 
 
Other post-Freudian perspectives on fetishism  
A general historical account 
According to Resnik (1979), at the basis of symbolization lies the aware depressive60 
elaboration of absence as a model of the expression of a lack, or loss, due to a traumatic 
separation (like the mother-child one), where the symbol phenomenologically arises as a 
new and indirect presence to fill up the not-being of the absence, taking the original 
object’s place. According to Fenichel (1945), fetishism necessarily implies some form of 
Ego’s splitting because of the attempt to unconsciously disavow (by Ego’s Ideal) a 
(painful) truth at the same time recognized by the conscious part of the individual’s 
personality (by the Ideal Ego). Furthermore, we agree with the statement of Laplanche 
and Pontalis (1973) according to whom, due to its basic characteristics of having 
fundamental relationships with the external reality, it is assumed that disavowal is a 
primary founding dynamic process of the human psychic reality rather than a simple 
defence mechanism related to a specific perceptive fact (A. Freud). Moreover, this last 
claim is based on the the Jacques Lacan symbolic register (whose valuable work will 
deserve further consideration), as already said. In particular, the theoretical framework of 
this author takes into consideration the general linguistic structure in the form given by R. 
Jakobson, in which, roughly speaking, the language is articulated on the two axes of the 
presence (syntagmatic level) and of the absence (paradigmatic level), that is to say, 
according to the rhetorical figures respectively of the metaphor (by condensation) and 
                                                59  Which are the three main negation operators of linguistics. 60  In the Melanie Klein sense. 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metonymy (by displacement). And the fetish61 formation, in its symbolic and material 
nature, just accomplishes to these. As we shall see, the above evaluations of Resnik will 
be in full agreement with the notions which will be later exposed. According to 
Alexander (1948), the origins of the notion of fetishism are particularly intricate. The first 
interpretations of fetishism date back to Alfred Binet and Richard von Krafft-Ebing in the 
1870s, which were retaken later by Freud himself who pointed out, above all, the 
symbolic meaning of the fetish object, and according to whom this symbolically 
represents a sort of female penis that the child fantastically imagines to be owned by the 
woman too, to avoid the Œdipus castration anxiety. Then, according to Giberti and Rossi 
(1996), Ellenberger (1970) and Greenacre (1971), the fetish is but the symbolic 
representation of the phallus. Furthermore, Giberti and Rossi (1996) and Greenacre 
(1971) briefly recall the related ideas of some authors, including E. Glover, O. Fenichel, 
P. Bergman, J. Harnik, E. Kronold, E. Vencovsky, S. Bonnett, S. Payne, M. Balint, W. H. 
Gillespie, R. C. Bak, P. Weissmann, M. Sperling, M. Wulff, E. Sterba, J. K. Friedjung, A. 
Z. Idelsohn, S. Lorand, P. Greenacre and others, according to whom the fetish (in its 
degenerate meaning) is a symbol of parts of the maternal body, used for the purpose of 
avoiding separation anxiety or to restore the integrity of the maternal body considered to 
be impaired or fragmented. Afterwards, J. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985) made a deeper 
historic-epistemological recognition of the most important contributions to this argument, 
reaching the conclusion that the fetish, as a depository for all the partial object loss during 
human development, allows both the separation from the mother and the castration 
complex with its anxious implications to be avoided. The fetish shows displacement and 
condensation properties. The former are related to attempts to shift the strong energetic 
charge associated with castration anxieties and fears (as well as frustrations) in such a 
manner as to minimize them. The latter, on the other hand, are mainly correlated to 
attempts to reorganize that lost unity of a fragmented corporal image that characterizes 
fetishism (see later). In this regard, for instance, Wulff62 reports some 1946 clinical cases 
of infantile fetishism in which the created fetish joined together in itself the various 
partial objects, again in accordance with the original meaning of the term “symbol”. 
However, on general perversions and their history, see above all Khan Masud (1979) and 
Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985).  
 
Some clinical data 
As already mentioned above, Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) stressed the fact that the 
disavowal mechanism could be a fundamental and common psychic mechanism. This 
might find further clinical confirmation in what follows. First, Freud himself pointed out 
the polymorphously perverse nature of the child, a feature which potentially persists until 
the advent of the Œdipus complex (see Rycroft, 1968a) and roughly consisting in the 
interchange of various erotogenic zones amongst them. It is not clear at what point of 
childhood psychosexual development takes place such as a set of disorganized and 
polymorphic perverse states (from which will depart neuroses and perversions). But then, 
according to Giberti and Rossi (1996, p. 332), higher or lower degrees of fetishism are 
present at every age and in every person, as well as in certain life circumstances like in 
                                                61  It  would  be  better  to  speak  of  a  transitional  object‐infantile  fetish  entity  (see later) instead of simple fetish.  62  See also Greenacre (1971). 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mourning and its elaboration (Kleinian depressive position63). Nunberg (1932, 1955, 
1975), in discussing perversions, states that within certain limits, the deviation of the 
object from the final sexual aim is quite normal. Raphling (1989), in discussing a case of 
female fetishism, states that the clinical example analysed by him confirms the existence 
of fetishism in women and suggests that subtle forms of perversion may go unnoticed and 
be more prevalent than previously realized. Greenacre (1971) states that forms of sexual 
perversions are far from being rare. Furthermore, in Greenacre (1971), the author states 
that there exists a ubiquitous and not worrying childish fetishism, mainly based on the 
need for contact with the maternal body (D. W. Winnicott), which will be spontaneously 
rejected around three or four years old, but that might degenerate in pathological cases. 
Therefore, according to studies made by O. Stevenson, D. W. Winnicott and M. Wulff 
(see Greenacre, 1971) fetishistic phenomena are almost always normally present through 
the phenomenology of transitional objects which play a fundamental role in the 
constitution of reality and of object relations. In Greenacre (1971), the author discusses 
on some researches about the normal presence of a fetish phenomenology in childhood 
which will be spontaneously abandoned after the phallic-Œdipus period. In this regard, 
see Spiegel (1967), in which the author states that this fact is very frequent in baby boys 
and baby girls. Freud gives a great deal to the ascertainment of the lack of a penis in the 
mother which is almost ubiquitous in childhood (see Greenacre (1971) because it is 
related to the almost equally ubiquitous anatomic sexual difference awareness. According 
to Garzotto (1985), fetishism represents the psychopathological degeneration (paraphilia) 
of a normal psychic modality in a child, during whose development he (or she) replaces 
the above-mentioned primitive (body) fragments with their symbolic substitutes like, for 
example, games, dolls, teddies, Lego, and so on (according to Winnicott). This tendency, 
known by Solomon and Patch (1971) as partialism, to privilege portions of object, or 
fragments (partial objects), in place of the global or entire one (total object), is just the 
essence of fetishism. In regard to the set of these fragments, the adult fetishist develops a 
drive which has the modalities of adult sexuality even if he (or she) is not able to cathexis 
his (or her) drives on the sexual object considered in its totality since this would re-evoke 
an anxious situation related to his (or her) incapacity to experience an adult love. Hence, 
he (or she) is unable to develop a global or unified sense. Following Greenacre (1971), 
the bodily Ego starts to develop from the first four months of life hereafter, where 
fundamental integration processes of the various sensorial (above all visual and tactile) 
explorations take place to give rise to a corporal Self as separate from the external world. 
In this period, the presymbolic formation of a transitional object and related phenomena 
according to the 1953 D. W. Winnicott seminal work take place, thanks to which the 
transition from the oral phase relation with the mother to the first real object relations 
with the external world is possible, and that will form the so-called transitional space. 
Winnicott proves that the childish fetish, which is almost ubiquitous, is usually formed by 
a preferred transitional object like a toy or any other object which has to do with the 
external world. This is both a Me-object and a not-Me-object until the not-being-Me is 
fully accepted, thus allowing the separation of opposites (see above point a)). According 
to R. Löwenstein, the transitional object may start from the genitals as well as the breasts. 
It will be put, by the child, into relationships with the body to give rise to his (or her) 
corporal image which, in fetishists, is the arena where those fantasies and memories are 
represented as corporal images instead of thought images. These corporal representations 
are often cathexed by strong aggressive and libidinal charges. As a result of this, 
                                                63  In  this  regard,  see  Zetzel  and Meissner  (1977).  Furthermore,  bear  this  in mind when we later talk about the known Freudian work on the so‐called fort­da game. 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fetishistic behaviour is often followed by strong guilt (see Kaplan & Sadock, 1997), 
mostly due to threats of castration. Finally, Thomä and Kächele (1989, 1992) claim that 
in fetishism is manifested the higher human imagination, whose subsequent (fetishistic) 
symptom formation may depend on pre-Œdipus or Œdipus conflicts in which the fetish 
object is chosen. In its pathological form, it frequently starts in adolescence and mainly 
concerns the male sex, but also with cases related to the female sex in which it speaks of 
a fetishist female according to Solomon and Patch (1971) and Lalli (1999). In the end, 
according to Sarteschi and Maggini (1982), the fetish sometimes represents the phallus, at 
other times not, albeit, in these latter cases, the illusion of its presence is maintained. The 
fetishist’s Ego, in accordance with the reality, admits that the female has no penis, but, 
notwithstanding this, he (or she) is deceived that she has at least one penis, the illusion 
being furnished by the fetish, which is the material substitute or surrogate of it. The fetish 
maintains the illusion of the phallus’s presence, so that it can be both a mere symbol (as 
in normal cases) and a material surrogate (in degenerations). On the basis of clinical 
observations made on subjects who underwent psychoanalytic treatment, the fear of 
castration is brought back either to violent experiences (whick took place between two 
and four years of age) that the child has been a witness to or victim of, or to severe 
organic disorders, which, in any case, will determine a disharmonic structuration of the 
image of the own body. From this, strong anxiety follows due to the view of that 
“unexplainable otherwise” of the female. Finally, following Piscicelli (1994), a certain 
degree of “fetishistic overvaluation” is usually also present in every normal love relation. 
The pathological case takes place when the desire for the fetish replaces the drive 
destination and becomes the unique interesting sexual object for the individual.  
 
Other perspectives on fetishism 
According to Glover (1933, 1949), at the foundations of fetishism, it relies on the basic 
unconscious mechanism of displacement64 through which genital interests and incestuous 
desires are degenerately displaced toward the upper or lower body parts. Above all he 
stressed the symbolic meaning of the fetish which may be various but with a prevalence 
for the phallic one, the latter being related to the presence of a female penis which, in a 
certain sense, is considered mysteriously hidden within the mother’s body. This last 
fantasy has a universal character in infancy,65 above all in male children, sometimes 
degenerating into paraphilia in adults, and with a regressive degeneration of genital 
Œdipus desires. According to Rosolato (1967, 1969) and Etchegoyen (1991), the fetish is 
the “counterpart of the subject’s splitting”, in the sense that the fetishist recognizes the 
castration but, because of his (or her) presentification of the imago66 of the female penis, 
he (or she) imagines the one that does not exist. D’après Lacan, presentification is the 
other face of what is disowned. The fetish, according to Lacan, presentificates (or 
embodies) and, at the same time, veils the female penis. According to Rosolato, the fetish 
manifests itself as separated from its corporeal support but, at the same time, is also in 
metonymic continuity with the body67 (object fetish in degenerate cases, or symbol in 
normal cases), and this is a fundamental consideration for our purposes because it is 
                                                64  According  to  Glover  (1953,),  the  displacement  mechanism  is  an  unconscious process with great applicative potentialities, above all for the symbolic function.  65  See Glover (1953). 66  According  to  Freud,  the  imago  is  an  unconscious  object  representation  (see Rycroft, 1968). 67  Through clothes, shoes, etc. in degenerate cases. 
 Language and Psychoanalysis, 2013, 2 (2), 77-120 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.2013.008 
 
113 
directly connected with the symbolic function when the degeneration into paraphilia does 
not take place. Due to this continuity, if the fetish is a metonymy, then it is also a 
metaphor for the mother’s lack of a penis because the former represents (presentificates) 
the latter. Thus, the fetish’s creation accomplishes both a metonymic function and a 
metaphoric one, with a prevalence of the former in degenerate cases and of the latter in 
normal cases. With this, we are at the beginnings of the Lacanian symbolic register which 
is based upon these last notions, as already said. In the Lacanian symbolic register, the 
two tropes68 metonymy and metaphor are put, following Roman Jakobson, in 
correspondence respectively with displacement and condensation, which are the two 
main unconscious dynamic mechanisms of the primary process.69 According to 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1973), human desire is primarily structured by an unconscious 
dynamic, being mainly expressed through metonymic processes. On the other hand, as 
mentioned above, the metonymic process is based, according to Jakobson, on 
displacement which can also be interpreted as a shift of unpleasant or painful sentiments 
from the distressing object (e.g. the female penis) to another (e.g. the fetish), thereby 
establishing a typical symbolic link. Furthermore, as we have repeatedly said above, the 
fetish (symbolic or material) is the result of a displacement of the strong castration 
anxiety, which D. W. Winnicott puts in close relationship with the transitional object to 
establish the first forms of object relations. Finally, we outline R. M. Khan Masud’s 
(1979) ideas on perversions. According to him, perversions are the result of an idolization 
of an external real object which is characterized by an overcathexis. This idolization 
occurs in place of any form of symbolization or imagination which are the normal 
alternatives to degeneration when the transitional object-infantile fetish phase (see later) 
is declining. Khan Masud noted an absence of transitional objects and toys in the 
childhood of perverts, which is also typified by the absence of any form of initiative. In 
every pervert, Khan Masud also detected a deficiency of elaboration of corporal 
experiences in psychic fantasies. Their fantastic elaborations are trivial and repetitive, so 
that their creative abilities are very poor. In perversions, there is a bad and incomplete 
separation of the opposite elements of Me and not-Me, so that there is not a complete 
separation between the external and internal reality sense. Khan Masud then identifies an 
intrinsic deficiency of the pervert to focalize and tune their emotions during the 
institution of any object relationship both intrapsychic and external. It is a typical feature 
of the pervert’s object relation which Anna Freud (1937) brings back to a pervert’s 
incapacity to love and to a great fear of emotions. On this Ego’s disability to support a 
suitable cathexis of an external object or of its internal representatives (internal objects as 
outcomes of symbolization or imagination) relies the main feature of the pervert’s object 
relations. Khan Masud brings back these inabilities to an early defect of the ability of the 
(bodily) Ego to perform integration processes, in turn due to a bad mother-child relation. 
And this will be confirmed many times by other authors (above all, by P. Greenacre), as 
we will see later.      
 
                                                68  En passant, we recall that metonymy and metaphor belong to the subcategory of tropes, this being included in the category of grammatical figures, in turn falling into the wider one of discourse (or rhetoric) figures. According to Roman Jakobson, such tropes are the two fundamental poles around which all languages revolve.  69  See Part 2 of this paper. 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Fetishism in the culture  
Other paradigms on fetishism besides the Freudian one have been formulated, like those 
of Charles de Brosses, August Comte, Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx: in this regard, for 
a brief account of these, see, for instance, Valeri (1979), Màdera (1977) and Galimberti 
(2006). Taking these into account, together with the Freudian one, it is possible to 
identify a common point amongst them. To be precise, the one according to which the 
fetish70 is conceived as an object71 formed by a contradictory relationship with the reality, 
or rather that gives, yes, a fictitious representation of reality but that makes a true 
representation of it also possible. The fetish thus realizes a sort of synthesis (fetishistic 
synthesis) between these two opposite tendencies which, although it is false in itself, 
nevertheless anticipates a true relation between the human being and nature, thereby 
constituting a first conceptual framework which makes the collection and classification of 
positive observations possible. Fetishism is based on a kind of confusion between 
“natural” and “supernatural”, between something having human nature and something 
having superhuman nature, or something having animated nature and something having 
inanimate nature. In Freud, then, such a position becomes more complex because it 
implies an initial object splitting (Was-spaltung) which will be correlative to a subsequent 
subject splitting (Ich-spaltung) that, in turn, turns out to be correlated with the former in 
normal cases, but not in pathological ones. Finally, both in Freud and Marx, the fetish’s 
genesis lies in the fictitious separation of the “part” from the “whole” (even if this is 
meant to be related to different total objects, namely the person in Freud and the work in 
Marx). And the latter is just a first form of the principle of inductive reasoning. On the 
other hand, bearing in mind that mysterious meaning of the fetish (and its relationship 
with the origins of religion and mythology), according to Greenacre (1971) and Freud 
himself, attempts to give explanations to the consequent basic secrets provided by the 
fetish itself lead to intellectual activity, first through sorcery, religion and mythology, 
then through science. An emblematic example of this is provided by Freud himself in the 
essay The Theme of the Three Caskets (of 1913), where, inter alia, he states that the 
fundamental secrets are those on the origins of life and of destiny which are, in turn, 
implicit in the impenetrable enigma of the riddle of the sphinx that Œdipus solved, 
thereby obtaining the opportunity to live. From this, A. Gross stated that the secret of the 
symbolism of mythology is, at the primitive level, in close relation with the processes and 
organs of the body and whose meaning is connected both with the fear of death and life 
relations. On the other hand, the secret is strictly related to the anal phase and its features, 
first of all the faeces,72 and the anus, this last place of secrecy and fortress of defence.  
 
The Phyllis Greenacre viewpoint 
According to Greenacre73 (1971), fetishism should be treated from the point of view of 
corporal image. During the changeover from the phallic to the Œdipus stage, a great 
                                                70 Which clearly has, as already said, a phallic meaning from the Freudian symbolic viewpoint. 71 This last term might be understood in the wider general philosophical meaning. 72  With its ambiguous meaning which is also closely linked to the ambiguity of the fetish  itself,  to  its  dual  nature  (like  bisexuality),  in  coherence  with  its  symbolic function.  73  The  work  (Greenacre  1971)  is  a  collectanea  of  some  of  the  main  works  of Phyllis Greenacre (1894‐1989), amongst which those on fetishism and creativity. 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castration problem subsists. This lies at the basis of every next Ego’s splitting acting on 
an already instable, insecure and little structured bodily image formed during pregential 
phases. In this moment of psychosexual development, the first forms of displacement and 
condensation processes take place in relation to the formation of a corporal image from 
its component parts, and in delineating its borders which, in turn, induce variations in the 
subjective perception of dimensions. The choice of fetish is quite undetermined, even if 
its nature will be determined by the outcomes of previous destabilizing prephallic 
castration anxieties. In Greenacre (1971), the author presents further considerations on 
fetishism, highlighting the mainly psychosomatic nature of it. To be precise, it is the 
result of a defect of the corporal image which the subject will remedy through a fetish 
creation in the absence of symbolic elaboration. In pregenital phases, there is a particular 
corporal sensibility which reaches its highest value during the phallic stage. In the same 
period, the formation of the corporal sense of Self takes place, crossed by strong 
aggressive and libidinal energies which, if not suitably managed, may lead to dissolution 
sentiments, hence to degenerative phenomena. In Greenacre (1971), the author confirms 
the primary role played by the formation of the bodily image of Self which presents both 
an internal and external aspect. Thanks to this, the child starts to be aware of his (or her) 
own genitals and of the visage. The core of this sense of identity is strongly structured 
and influenced, from the anal stage until the phallic-Œdipus period, by many factors 
concerning the external world. In this phase, the child is aware of herself or himself as 
existing in a world of external objects. He or she hears have memories and thoughts, 
learns to evaluate her or his own dimensions, has knowledge of sexual differences and of 
many parts of her or his own body. In creative subjects, this image of Self is quite 
unstable and susceptible to possible diversifications. In Greenacre (1971), the author 
expresses the idea that bodily Ego’s disorders (at the root of fetishism) are mainly due to 
the inadequacy of relationships with parents during the first two years of existence which 
will be at the basis of a primary emphasis given to castration anxieties and to 
complementary narcissistic defences. In Greenacre (1971), the author summarizes 
perversions and their dynamic aspects. In particular, for our purposes, it is important to 
outline some points of her study, particularly those examining material fetish and its 
comparison with imagination. The fetish, as stated, develops from an imperfect formation 
of the own corporal image during the related libidinal phases, above all connected to 
genital organization, with more or less severe repercussions on reality sense. The main 
feature of fetishism is first an excellent degree of primary identification, which is a 
normal characteristic of every human being, but which, in pathological degeneration, is 
distinguished by a prolongation of the introjective-projective phase (typical preconscious 
mechanism of primary identification), in which there is an incomplete separation between 
the own Ego and the Other, that is to say, a poor separation of the elements of the 
opposite pair (I, not-I) or (Me, not-Me), as outlined above. This is mainly due to the fact 
that a fetishist is unable to make a clear distinction between opposite images that he (or 
she) has of female genital organs, as Freud himself claimed in 1938, notwithstanding he 
(or she) is able to distinguish between males and females as mental categories, but not to 
compare their genital apparatuses. All this, according to Freud (and as confirmed later by 
other psychoanalysts like K. Abraham and S. Payne), will be at the basis of a weakness of 
the Ego. In 1965, R. A. Spitz pointed out that visual abilities are focalized quite early, so 
that the recognition of anatomic gender differences (above all in genitals) is available 
quite early for the child. This is a notable fact for organizing and structuring own corporal 
image which starts from the previous recognition of the bodily image of genital settings. 
All this takes place from before four years old, in fact from about two years old, when the 
child is also able to roughly recognize her or his mirror image. Nevertheless, the 
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recognition of genital settings, in both our and other organization, starts before the 
corporal one. The child takes this as a system of comparison to be used for the formation 
of a sense of reality. In Glover (1933), the author states that perversions help in taking 
together the various partialities and objects (like the many external perceptions) which 
come from the development of a sense of reality, also through symbolic formation 
processes. According to Glover, the formation of a sense of reality depends on the 
emancipation of a system of bodily and environmental perception from excessive 
interference through introjection and projection mechanisms. According to M.S. Mahler 
and P. Greenacre, the second and fourth years of existence are crucial for human psychic 
development in which there is a high corporal sensitivity and confusion about the bodily 
organization, especially the genital one. The question of the lack of a female penis 
strongly requires a solution. The emotional shock involved in it may compromise the 
reality sense formation. The aggressiveness, usually present in these periods, together 
with other defence mechanisms, may hinder a degeneration of this trauma toward 
paraphilic disorders. In any case, the strong castration anxiety anguish requires a 
displacement to be cathexed. According to Greenacre (1971), the genetic bases for 
fetishism are mainly twofold, and take place between two and four years old. The first 
concerns the frequent and careful view of the genitals of the opposite sex. The second 
may concern the occasional sight of a severe bleeding wound on one’s own body or of 
another person. The vision, in this period, plays a very fundamental role, even before the 
development of other senses. In the first and more common case, the child focalizes other 
genitals, comparing them with their own. In such a manner, when one sees other genitals, 
the not-Me (or not-I) is much clearer than the Me (or I), and if the emotional involvement 
of this comparison is not sufficiently controlled, a confusion about own genital setting 
will be possible, giving rise to paraphilic degenerations. Analogously, in the second case, 
the damage undergone by the not-Me might give rise to veiled fantasies which, in turn, 
may contribute to increased confusional images of one’s own body. If not adequately 
controlled and assisted by (good) motherly cares (see Winnicott’s holding74 notion), these 
traumatic experiences may induce great anxiety and guilt feelings, also thanks to the fact 
that, in this period (from about two to four years old), there is a major sensorial 
susceptibility in concomitance with the beginnings of the formation of own corporal 
image. Around two years old, the first steps and words start to appear, while the genital 
(phallic and vaginal) physiological pressures will appear around four years old. During 
this period, all the above-mentioned influences may flow out in intense fears of castration 
which may also assume a certain aspect of reality that will lead to paraphilic disorders, 
including (material) fetish formation. The material fetish must be so real to avoid such 
strong and unbearable fears of castration. Nevertheless, as already stated several times, 
this fetish creation may be accomplished too by means of symbolic elaboration, most of 
the time originally due to the simple search for a missing mother penis.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                74  Also known as holding environment. 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